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Abstract
This article will analyze the activity of state-owned companies and their place in the structure of 
market relations from the standpoint of contemporary approaches to the study of “state failure” and 
“market failure”. It will also consider the implications of the systematic embedding of private proper-
ty rights. In addition to considering the costs of the functions of state-owned companies, the authors 
 address the actual experience of the Russian economy in the present day, the experience of forming 
state corporations and the risks associated with their operation. Particular attention will be paid to the 
inhibition of incentives to improve the general institutional environment and, conversely, to the increas-
ing incidence of direct state intervention in matters that affect economic development. We will examine 
the various ways in which the growth of the public sector, de jure and de facto, reduces opportunities 
for implementing private property rights.
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1. Introduction
Contemporary economic theory maintains that there is no “universally appropriate” form 
of property — a form that can be considered superior to all other forms of property and be 
implemented in any country and in all branches and sectors of the economy, irrespective of 
VSHFL¿FKLVWRULFDOFRQGLWLRQV(YHQWKH³SXUH´IRUPVRISURSHUW\LQWKHRYHUZKHOPLQJPD-
MRULW\RIFDVHVDUHLQUHDOLW\FRPSRVLWH$WWKHVDPHWLPHFRPSDULVRQVRIWKHHI¿FLHQF\RI
different forms of property (entrepreneurship) in particular spheres of economic activity do 
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not discount and cannot discount, particularly in the circumstances of present-day “globaliza-
tion”, the effect of mechanisms of central regulation.
7KHPRVW DFXWH SUREOHPVRI SUHVHQWGD\ HFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW DUH LQÀXHQFHGE\ WKH
“structural interaction” of private and state-owned companies in different sectors of the 
economy.1 The existence of one form of property relations or another in particular spheres 
of economic activity and the interaction of these forms are, as a rule, the outcome of lengthy 
processes of evolution. More often than not, these forms have been shaped by the particulari-
ties of historical development (“path dependence”), and they bear the imprint of the political 
and socio-cultural traditions that prevail in any particular society.
For example, A. Greif, in his detailed study of differences in the trading practices of the 
merchants of Genoa and the Maghreb during the Middle Ages, noted that in the period that 
followed, private entrepreneurs in the East were deprived of the opportunity to effectively de-
fend themselves against state interference. Their activity was regulated by religious or secu-
lar authorities and sometimes, simultaneously, by both. Currently, the institutions of under-
developed countries bear a resemblance to those of the Maghreb, whereas institutions of the 
GHYHORSHG:HVWEHDUDFORVHUUHVHPEODQFHWRWKRVHRI*HQRDVHH*UHLI3±
±)RUFHQWXULHVLQWKH(DVWKXJHHFRQRPLFHQWHUSULVHVZHUHPDQDJHGDWWKHKLJKHVW
level of government, and in these circumstances, the productivity or workers, who in many 
cases were held in a condition of social subjugation, was low. For structures “of Oriental 
origin, the fact of being close to government or separate from government has always had 
JUHDWLPSRUWDQFH6LJQL¿FDQWO\LQ2ULHQWDOVRFLHWLHVDQXQFHUHPRQLRXVDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVWKH
private property of those who did not stand in close proximity to the government has always 
been common. Unquestioning submission of the institution of private property and of pro-
SHUW\RZQHUVDVDVRFLDOVWUDWXPZDVWKHQRUP´9DVLOLHY3
The emergence of political-legal conditions that provide the optimal environment for in-
tensive long-term economic growth has usually been associated with a contraction of the pre- 
H[LVWLQJFODQIHXGDORUDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRPPDQGV\VWHPRIDOOSHUYDVLYHUHJXODWLRQ+RZHYHU
new institutional theorists frequently refer to the “fundamental political dilemma” formulated by 
%5:HLQJDVW³$JRYHUQPHQWVWURQJHQRXJKWRSURWHFWSURSHUW\ULJKWVDQGHQIRUFHFRQWUDFWV
LVDOVRVWURQJHQRXJKWRFRQ¿VFDWHWKHZHDOWKRILWVFLWL]HQV´:HLQJDVW3,QVRPH
contemporary, post-communist, developing states, the formula “growth in the shadow of ex-
propriation” seems relevant as a description of the dilemmas encountered when constraints are 
placed upon the institution of private property (Aguiar and Amador, 2011). 
/LPLWLQJWKHVFRSHRIJRYHUQPHQWDFWLYLW\GRHVQRWE\LWVHOIHQVXUHPRUHHI¿FLHQWHFR-
nomic management or guarantee the emergence of market relations. Commenting about the 
logic of the transition of post-communist countries to a market economy, in his Nobel Prize 
VSHHFKLQ5&RDVHMXVWO\UHPDUNHGWKDWZLWKRXWWKHDSSURSULDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVQRPDU-
NHWHFRQRP\RIDQ\VLJQL¿FDQFHFDQH[LVWDGGLQJWKDWWKH³FXOWLYDWLRQ´RIVXFKLQVWLWXWLRQV
DOZD\VUHTXLUHVWLPHDQGHIIRUW&RDVH37KLVLVZK\PHDVXUHVWKDWDXJPHQW
the role of decentralized (“market-based”) regulation can, in developed countries, often turn 
out to be successful, whereas similar measures are inapplicable in the same form in countries 
that are still undergoing the effects of administrative command-type regulation. This circum-
stance serves to underline the priority that has to be given to the activation of competition 
mechanisms and the perfection of market institutions.
With regard to the costs incurred by the “failures” of state activity, it is not argued, and 
it cannot be argued, that every state activity is necessarily unproductive and that, accord-
ingly, the state should be driven out of economic life by private enterprise. Adam Smith, who 
 attached great importance to the “invisible hand” of the market, included amongst the direct 
 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the terms “state-owned company” and “state-owned enterprise” are employed in this 
article synonymously to describe any economic entity that is more or less controlled by the state. The term “state 
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obligations of the state: “…erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those pub-
lic works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, 
DUHKRZHYHURIVXFKDQDWXUHWKDWWKHSUR¿WFRXOGQHYHUUHSD\WKHH[SHQVHWRDQ\LQGLYLGXDO
or small number of individuals…” Noting the essential nature of “public works” and of state 
HQWHUSULVHVWKHJUHDWHFRQRPLVWHPSKDVL]HGWKDWWKHIXO¿OPHQWRIWKHVHREOLJDWLRQVUHTXLUHG
WKDWDYDULHW\RIH[SHQGLWXUHVEHXQGHUWDNHQIURPWLPHWRWLPH6PLWK3
No more than acknowledgment of “market failures” implies a requirement to repudiate 
market relations should drawing attention to the “failures of the state” be taken to be a denial 
of its important economic functions. On the contrary, many negative phenomena and many 
LQHI¿FLHQW DQGKLJKO\ZDVWHIXO HFRQRPLFRSHUDWLRQVFDQEHDWWULEXWHG WR WKH LQVXI¿FLHQF\
of state involvement in vital areas of the economy. Privatization or nationalization are, 
LQKHUHQWO\DQGWRDVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHHWHFKQLFDOSURFHVVHVLWLVWKHV\VWHPLFHPEHGGLQJRI
private property rights that engenders the relationships of trust that are essential if there are 
to be prospects for economic development.
The downside of state activity is the erosion of private property rights brought about 
by selective state intervention in relations between economic actors. Amongst the dangers 
lurking along this path, the great philosophers and economists have drawn attention to the 
assumption by the state, in violation of “natural” market norms, of the right to determine the 
transfer of property from one participant to another,2 the state thereby acquiring legitimacy as 
a type of donor of the rights of ownership. We will touch upon this problem in our examina-
tion of the functioning of state-owned companies in Russia. 
2. State entrepreneurship, “political markets”, and the market environment
In the theoretical literature, the expansion (or contraction) of state participation in the econo-
my is most often linked with the need to overcome “market failures” (or, less frequently, “state 
failures”). Frequently, a complicated web of relationships exists between state enterprises and 
the market environment. It goes without saying that formal differences in property rights (and, 
accordingly, differences in status in the social or private sector of the economy) are of impor-
WDQFH+RZHYHU WKHVHFDQEH IDU OHVVVLJQL¿FDQW WKDQGLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKHVWUXFWXUHRIPDUNHW
relations and differences in the real status of companies and in their actual market behavior.
In some cases, the market is one of intensive competition, and it achieves optimal results 
through competitive interaction between state and private companies. In other cases, compa-
nies owned by the central government or by local authorities take advantage of their privi-
leges, exploit their monopoly position, and place technical-organizational, administrative, 
and other barriers in the way of access to a particular branch of the economy.
In theory, state companies that have not been given any privileged status and are able to 
operate in an active competitive environment can be relatively immune to the vicissitudes of 
LPPHGLDWHFLUFXPVWDQFHVZRUNWRDORQJHUSODQQLQJKRUL]RQDQGEHSHUIHFWO\YLDEOH+RZ-
ever, most authors who analyze the mechanisms of regulation and control tend to assume 
not only that so-called “political markets” are inherent in democratic systems but also that 
these markets function unproblematically. The problem of the delegation of authority (the 
agency problem) is located not within the state but in the relationship between voters and 
politicians — and these relationships are then decked out in “market attire”. As a rule, the 
 2 ³3URSHUW\PXVWEHVWDEOHDQGPXVWEH¿[HGE\JHQHUDOUXOHV7KRXJKLQRQHLQVWDQFHWKHSXEOLFEHDVXIIHUHU
this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order which it 
HVWDEOLVKHVLQVRFLHW\´+XPH9RO3'1RUWKKDVSURYLGHGDVRPHZKDWGLIIHUHQWIRUPXODWLRQ
of this law: Whenever the state has succeeded in creating the “best” (bringing comparatively greater advantages to 
the ruling elites) structure of property, one that maximizes the rent appropriated by the ruler (and his group), such 
SURSHUW\UHODWLRQVKDYHXVXDOO\HQWHUHGLQWRFRQÀLFWZLWKWKHQHHGIRULQWHQVLYHHFRQRPLFJURZWKVHH1RUWK
3±
  A detailed review of the theoretical aspects of this problem is provided in Radygin and Entov, 2012.
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defenders of the relative effectiveness of the state sector take it for granted that the effects of 
FRPSHWLWLYHSROLWLFDOPDUNHWVDUHEHQH¿FLDO
In fact, there is a great deal of evidence that indicates that assertions regarding the relative 
HIIHFWLYHQHVVRISROLWLFDOPDUNHWVDUHQRWZHOOIRXQGHG+HUHZHDUHWDONLQJQRWVLPSO\RI
“market failures” but of an absence of the basic pre-conditions for the effective function-
ing of political markets. There can be few branches of political economy in which the gulf 
 between theory and practice is so great.
In the present article, we will not be able to examine all aspects of this complex problem: 
3ROLWLFDOPDUNHWV LQFRXQWULHVZLWKGLIIHUHQWSROLWLFDOV\VWHPVKDYH WKHLURZQVSHFL¿FLWLHV
:HZLOOUHIHURQO\WRWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI'1RUWKZKRKDVDUJXHGIRUH[DPSOHWKDWLWLV
PXFKPRUHGLI¿FXOWLQGHPRFUDWLFFRXQWULHVWKDQLQPDQDJHGVRFLHWLHVWRLPSRVHDSUHFLVH
set of conditions on political markets and, in particular, to ensure the observance of these 
FRQGLWLRQV7KHGLI¿FXOWLHVDULVHSULPDULO\RXWRIWKHSDUWLFXODUUHODWLRQVKLSRI³H[FKDQJHRI
votes for promises” and with the lack of practical means for enforcing the conditions. The 
complexity of political arrangements can make for “fuzziness”. Moreover, as North correctly 
notes, it is institutionally impossible to impose credible commitments in relations between 
the principal and the agent. It therefore transpires that the political interactions involved are 
LQIDFWVLPSO\QRWFRPSDUDEOHZLWKWKRVHRIQRUPDOHFRQRPLFPDUNHWV1RUWK
2IODWHWKLVFRQFHSWLRQKDVEHHQORRNHGXSRQDVDPHUHWKHRUHWLFDO³H[HUFLVH´LQWKH¿HOG
RI SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\7KLV GRHV QRWPHDQ RI FRXUVH WKDW WKH LQÀXHQFH ZKLFK LV FOHDUO\
EHQH¿FLDORYHUDOORIGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVVHVRQWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIHFRQRPLFSURFHVVHVLVXQGHU
question. The issue is, rather, related to the appropriateness of the analogy that is being drawn 
between the markets that function in the economic and political spheres.5 In addition, the 
strategies of the participants in such markets are determined by existing institutional struc-
tures and behavioral norms. Established socio-political traditions (conditions) can give rise 
to market situations when, as it were, conditions of “bad equilibria” prevail. 
From the point of view of empirical analysis, the following circumstance is important. As 
DQXPEHURI UHVHDUFKVWXGLHVKDYHVKRZQDQ LPSRUWDQW IDFWRU IRU LQFUHDVLQJHI¿FLHQF\ LQ WKH
 aftermath of privatization is not only the change in the form of the property of particular enter-
SULVHV EXW WKH DFWLYL]DWLRQ RI FRPSHWLWLRQZLWKLQ WKH DSSURSULDWH EUDQFK VWUXFWXUHV 'RQDKXH
)XUWKHUPRUHLQFDVHVZKHUHDVWDWHFRPSDQ\HQWHUVPDUNHWVZKHUHLQWHQVLYHFRPSHWLWLRQ
is present, and where — and this is particularly important — government does not provide the 
company in question with particular privileges or concessions (including almost a complete lack 
of transparency), its competitiveness in the industry branch in question can be fairly effective.
/HWXVQRWHWKHOLPLWVZLWKLQZKLFKVXFKFRPSDULVRQVDUHYDOLG,QVRPHLPSRUWDQWLQVWDQ
ces when we come to characterize the activity of state enterprises, different evaluative criteria 
can and must be applied, and these lie outside of the framework of the market principle of the 
maximization of net income.
,QDQXPEHURIFRXQWULHVLQ:HVWHUQ(XURSHHJ)UDQFH*UHDW%ULWDLQ1RUZD\PDQ\
state-owned or semi-state-owned companies do not differ greatly from private companies 
in their status or in the “nature of their activity”. For example, the demands made by the 
  $V ':LWWPDQ KDV QRWHG ³EHKLQG HYHU\ PRGHO RI JRYHUQPHQW IDLOXUH LV DQ DVVXPSWLRQ RI H[WUHPH YRWHU
VWXSLGLW\VHULRXVODFNRIFRPSHWLWLRQRUH[FHVVLYHO\KLJKQHJRWLDWLRQWUDQVIHUFRVWV´:LWWPDQ3
 5 )RUIXUWKHUGHWDLORQWKHLQWHUUHODWLRQVRIIRUPVRISROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFHI¿FLHQF\VHH$FHPRJOX
DQG5RELQVRQ
  'HVFULELQJWKHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVWKDWXQGHUOLHWKHPRGHOVWKDWSUHVXSSRVHWKHSUHGRPLQDQFHRI³EDGSROLWLFLDQV´
)&DVHOOLDQG00RUHOOLDI¿UPWKDWWKH\KDYHSUDFWLFDONQRZOHGJHRIWKHSKHQRPHQRQGHVFULEHGLQWKHPRGHOLQ
a particular country (of course, not named) where political life displays “self-sustaining bad equilibria” (Caselli and 
0RUHOOL3
  In such cases, the accounting data published by a state company can provide a more or less unbiased picture of 
LWVHI¿FLHQF\&RQYHUVHO\LQFRQGLWLRQVRIROLJRSROLVWLFPDUNHWUHODWLRQVHYHQDSULYDWHFRPSDQ\FDQPDQLSXODWHLWV
accounts and attempt to conceal relatively high costs.
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 government of state companies are not so much political but commercial or “market-based” 
in character. Their basic activity is, as it were, “embedded” in the general system of competi-
WLYHUHODWLRQV,IWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIVXFKVWDWHFRPSDQLHVGHFOLQHVVLJQL¿FDQWO\DQGWKH\LQFXU
major losses, this provides grounds for fundamental reorganization and, recently, ever more 
often, for “divestiture” and the privatization of some components of the economic entity that 
previously had the status of a state-owned company.
In addition to nationalizing large companies that are of strategic importance to the econo-
my, governments sometimes resort to the indirect regulation of their activity. Most often, this 
involves the regulation of the output prices of companies that are considered (with more or 
OHVVMXVWL¿FDWLRQWREH³QDWXUDOPRQRSROLHV´,QFRQGLWLRQVRIVHULRXVHFRQRPLFXSKHDYDO
regulation is extended to sectors of the economy that are characterized with “excessive” com-
SHWLWLRQ,QWKH¿UVWLQVWDQFHWKHJRYHUQPHQWXVXDOO\WULHVWROLPLWWKHH[WHQWRILPSHQGLQJ
price (or tariff) increases.
7KLVW\SHRIUHJXODWLRQXQTXHVWLRQDEO\RIWHQKDVDSRVLWLYHHIIHFW+RZHYHUDV-RVHSK6WLJOHU
has convincingly argued, concern for the defense of consumers from an excessive increase in 
WKHFRVWRIOLYLQJRIWHQJLYHVWKHUHJXODWHGFRPSDQLHVDJUHDWHULQÀXHQFHRQJRYHUQPHQWHFR-
QRPLFSROLF\6WLJOHU%\LQWURGXFLQJUHJXODWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQWLVHVVHQWLDOO\³SURWHFW-
ing” these companies from the effects of market competition and presiding over an accelerated 
enrichment of top managers and private owners. (A number of authors, following Stigler, have 
written of a de facto “capture” of the state by the regulated companies.) In such circumstances, 
DVLJQL¿FDQWGHFOLQHLQWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHUHJXODWHGEUDQFKRIWKHHFRQRP\LVLQHYLWDEOH
The expansion of public ownership in the economy and the scope of government regula-
tion inevitably come up against certain limits that are determined above all by a relative de-
FOLQHLQSURGXFWLYHDQGDOORFDWLYHHI¿FLHQF\$WWKLVSRLQWSURJUDPVWHQGWREHIRUPXODWHGIRU
the reform, privatization and deregulation of state-owned companies. This particular change 
in direction was very marked during the last decades of the twentieth century. The very con-
cept of “state-owned enterprise” and the policy of nationalization lost the sacrosanct status 
(their “thaumaturgic valence”) that had been conferred upon them even by representatives of 
WKHYDULRXVHOLWHV7RQLQHOOL3
Some studies have paid particular attention to the factors that precipitated the reform of 
WKHSXEOLFVHFWRU+&DPSRVDQG+(VIDKDQLFDUULHGRXWDVWDWLVWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFDQDO\VLV
RIWKHIDFWRUVWKDWZHUHFRQGXFLYHWRWKHUHIRUPRIVWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVLQ¿IWHHQFRXQW
ries, most of which were developing countries. Of course, amongst such factors, we have to 
include the growth in the size of the public sector. Additionally, an assessment of the relevant 
SURELWUHJUHVVLRQVKDVFRQ¿UPHGWKDWDWWHPSWVDWVWUXFWXUDOUHIRUPWHQGWREHXQGHUWDNHQDW
DWLPHZKHQDFRXQWU\LVH[SHULHQFLQJVHULRXVHFRQRPLFGLI¿FXOWLHV$VWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK
the decline in economic activity becomes greater, so does the likelihood, all other things be-
ing equal, that attempts will be made to reform the public sector. The propensity to undertake 
reform increases proportionately with increases in the dependence of the country upon exter-
QDOHFRQRPLFIDFWRUV&DPSRVDQG(VIDKDQL
This last factor can be linked to the clear reaction in the past in South Africa to sanctions 
imposed by industrially developed countries. Recently, privatization processes have gathered 
PRPHQWXPLQ,UDQ)RUH[DPSOHLQ0D\WKH,UDQLDQDXWKRULWLHVPDGHSXEOLFQHZSUR-
posals for structural reform. While retaining strict central control over the most important 
VWUDWHJLFLQVWDOODWLRQVWKHJRYHUQPHQWSURSRVHGVWDUWLQJDWWKHHQGRIVHOOLQJFRP-
panies to private buyers, including a number of large electrical power stations.  Already, 
a number of important privatization programs have been implemented in the Iranian metal-
lurgical industry.8
 8 $FFRUGLQJWRWKH,UDQLDQ'HSXW\0LQLVWHUIRUWKH0LQLQJ,QGXVWU\DWSUHVHQWVWHHODQGFRRSHUSURGXFWLRQLQWKH
country has been fully privatized, and almost half of the productive capacity of the aluminium industry has been 
SULYDWL]HG,UDQ'DLO\1RYHPEHU
 $5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
The economic consequences of privatization have been examined in detail in a number 
RI SXEOLFDWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ RXU RZQ VHH IRU H[DPSOH5DG\JLQ HW DO 5DG\JLQ DQG
(QWRY/HWXVFRQVLGHURQO\DQXPEHURI WKHUHVXOWVRIHFRQRPLFUHIRUPVDLPHGDW
encouraging competition and the removal of strict measures of state regulation. One example 
is the deregulation of air transport in the USA, which demonstrated how powerful the ef-
fect of increased market competition can be in bringing down tariffs and transport costs. 
In a number of works (Megginson, 2005, Ch. 2), it has been shown that during the years 
±WKHVRFLDOORVVHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHVWDWHUHJXODWLRQRISDUWLFXODUVHFWRUVRIWKH
economy increased steeply. Particular attention has been drawn to the dependence of the 
tariffs of mono polies upon political factors.In the new circumstances, the actions of legisla-
tive and executive branches of government have been aimed at liquidating (or weakening) 
SUHH[LVWLQJRI¿FLDOFRQVWUDLQWVXSRQFRPSHWLWLRQ
7KHHVVHQFHRIWKHSURFHVVKDVEHHQZHOOGHVFULEHGE\(%DLOH\³-XVWDVWKHUHJXODWRU\
PRYHPHQWRIWKHVUHÀHFWHGWKHYLHZWKDWPDUNHWIDLOXUHZDVSHUYDVLYHVRWKHGHUHJXOD-
WLRQPRYHPHQWRIWKHODWHVDQGHDUO\VUHÀHFWHGWKHYLHZWKDWHFRQRPLFUHJXODWLRQ
RISULFHVDQGHQWU\ZDVDJRYHUQPHQWIDLOXUHJHQHUDWLQJPLVDOORFDWLRQVDQGLQHI¿FLHQFLHV´
%DLOH\3
7KHVLJQL¿FDQWUHGXFWLRQLQDLUWUDQVSRUWDWLRQFRVWVLQWKH86$ZDVDWWULEXWDEOHDERYHDOO
to a freeing up of the forces of competition. The number of aviation companies operating air 
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQEHWZHHQVWDWHVLQFUHDVHGIURPLQWRLQ)OLJKWVZHUHPRUH
fully booked, and not only did aggregate costs fall, but so did the cost of various services. 
%HWZHHQDQGWKHDYHUDJHWDULIISHUPLOHRISDVVHQJHUDQGFDUJRWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
IHOOE\RYHUWZRWLPHV$FFRUGLQJWRWKHFDOFXODWLRQVRI%DLOH\GHVSLWHDVLJQL¿FDQWLQFUHDVH
in the cost of aviation fuel, the average fare per passenger mile for air transport in the USA, 
H[SUHVVHGLQGROODUVIHOOIURPWRFHQWVEHWZHHQDQG7KHUHGXF-
tion in prices brought about by market competition delivered a value to consumers estimated 
at approximately 28 billion dollars per annum by 2005.
In the past few decades, a number of countries have implemented radical programs of de-
regulation of the production and supply of electricity. In the USA, companies that produced elec-
tricity were excluded from the distribution network and conditions were created for the emer-
JHQFHRIDVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURILQGHSHQGHQWSURGXFHUVDQGIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFRPSHWLWLYH
PDUNHWV DW WKH UHJLRQDO OHYHO$W WKH HQGRI WKHV WKHUHZDV DFRPSUHKHQVLYH UHRUJDQL
]DWLRQRISURSHUW\UHODWLRQVLQWKH¿HOGRIDWRPLFHQHUJ\3ULYDWHEX\HUVZHUHDEOHWRDFTXLUH
DWRPLFUHDFWRUV7KHDQDO\VLVRIWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHVHUHIRUPVWKHGDWDZHUHH[DPLQHGIRUWKH
ODVW\HDUVVKRZHGWKDWWKHFRHI¿FLHQWVRIWKHRSHUDWLRQDOHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHXVHRIHOHFWULFDO
production plants increased on average by 10%. This was achieved above all by a transition to 
ÀH[LEOHUHJLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVDQGE\DUHGXFWLRQLQRXWDJHVLQHOHFWULFLW\VXSSO\'HUHJXODWLRQ
KDGDEHQH¿FLDOHFRORJLFDOHIIHFWHVWLPDWHGDWDYDOXHRIPLOOLRQGROODUVD\HDU10
7KHDEROLWLRQRIDVXEVWDQWLDOQXPEHURIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHEDUULHUVVLJQL¿FDQWO\IDFLOLWDWHG
access to previously half-closed branches of the economy.11 The expansion of the sphere 
RIWKHRSHUDWLRQRIPDUNHWPHFKDQLVPVOHGWRDPDUNHGLPSURYHPHQWLQHI¿FLHQF\DQGKDG
EHQH¿FLDO HIIHFWV RQ WKH KHDOWK RI HFRQRPLF VWUXFWXUHV7KH WUDQVLWLRQ WR GHUHJXODWHG DLU
transportation in the USA enhanced competition in the world market and provided an im-
  ,WKDVEHHQVKRZQWKDWWKLVW\SHRISULFHUHJXODWLRQDOZD\VGHSHQGVWRDVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHHXSRQVRFLRSROLWLFDO
conditions and in particular upon the extent to which the mechanisms of political competition are effective. For 
example, in the USA, in states where the regulatory organizations are elective and depend, therefore, upon the 
opinion of the electorate, the average level of prices for electricity is, as a rule, lower than in states where the 
PHPEHUVRIVXFKRUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHDSSRLQWHG3DXODQG6FKRHQLQJ
 10 $GHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKHVHSURFHVVHVFDQEHIRXQGLQ'DYLVDQG:ROIUDPDQGDOVRLQ=KDQJ7KH
HFRQRPLFFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHGHUHJXODWLRQRIDWRPLFHQHUJ\LQWKH8.DUHH[DPLQHGLQ7D\ORU
 11 It was as a consequence of deregulation that the total of capital investment in the industry of developed countries 
PHPEHUVRIWKH2(&'VXEVWDQWLDOO\LQFUHDVHGVHHȺOHVLQDHWDO
$5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
SHWXVIRUSULYDWL]DWLRQLQRWKHUFRXQWULHVHJWKHSULYDWL]DWLRQRI%ULWLVK$LUZD\VLQ
The experience of deregulation once again showed that the forms of state regulation that had 
been introduced during the previous period gave rise to more problems that they resolved. 
At the present time, a debate is being waged over the extent of the economic and social risks 
involved. In this connection, we can point to the lively discussion in the USA over proposals 
for the privatization of many highways (see, for example, Winston, 2010, 2012). 
The freeing up of the forces of competition, given the necessary conditions, has contrib-
uted to the momentum in favor of the formation of an innovation economy.12 Measures for 
privatization and deregulation in recent decades have accelerated the advancement of sci-
HQWL¿FWHFKQLFDOSURJUHVVLQVXFKQHWZRUNEUDQFKHVRIWKHHFRQRP\DVWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV
air transport, electricity generation and others. Clearly, despite difference in their political 
systems, the drive in a number of states for the reorganization of existing institutions, with 
DYLHZWRLPSURYLQJHFRQRPLFHI¿FLHQF\LVPDNLQJKHDGZD\ The “Economic Freedom” 
LQGH[GHYLVHGE\WKH&DQDGLDQ)UDVHU,QVWLWXWHVWRRGDWRQWKHHYHRIWKHFULVLV
ZKHUHDVLQLWGLGQRWULVHKLJKHUWKDQ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGKRZHYHUWKDWSURFHVVHVRI
GHUHJXODWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKH¿QDQFLDOVSKHUHKDYHUHVXOWHGLQWKHIRUPDWLRQRIVSHFXOD-
tive “bubbles”, particularly in the onset of the destructive economic crisis in the USA from 
±
2(&'H[SHUWVKDYHHYDOXDWHGWKHDYHUDJHVKDUHRIVWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVLQWKHVDOHVDV-
VHWVDQGPDUNHWYDOXHRIWKHWHQODUJHVW¿UPVLQDQXPEHURIFRXQWULHV7KHOHDGHUVLQWKLVOLVW
DUH7KH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDWKH8$(5XVVLD,QGRQHVLD
0DOD\VLD  DQG6DXGL$UDELD  ,Q LQGXVWULDOO\ GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV WKH VKDUH LV
VLJQL¿FDQWRQO\ LQ1RUZD\$PRQJVW WKH³OHDGHUV´&KLQDDQG5XVVLDVWDQGRXWEH-
cause in these countries, state-owned companies are of considerable importance not only in 
the extractive industries but also in a number of strategic branches of the processing industries 
.RZDOVNLHWDO7KHH[WHQVLYHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVDQGWKHH[WHQWWR
which they are embedded in the extractive industries of the Near East and of South-East Asia 
(at the beginning of the 2010s, the aggregate value of their sales was one and a half times 
JUHDWHUWKDQWKH*'3RI*UHDW%ULWDLQSURYLGHFOHDUHYLGHQFHRIWKHRSHUDWLRQRISRZHUIXO
objective factors consolidating their position in the national economy. (These issues are exa-
PLQHGLQJUHDWHUGHWDLOLQIRUH[DPSOH5RVV6WHYHQV1DVKDVKLELHWDO
In a number of cases, particularly during the implementation of long-term economic stra-
tegy, the operation of state-owned companies has made it possible to cushion the effects of the 
³IDLOXUHV´RIZRUOGDQGRUQDWLRQDOPDUNHWV6WDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVFDQIDFLOLWDWHWKHRSH
ration of a branch of the economy where conditions of natural monopoly are present. Many 
economic complexes belonging to the state go out of their way to encourage a discussion of 
long-term programs for their own development. The adoption of long-term market strategies 
requires the enumeration of a range of objectives, and one consequence is the avoidance of a 
DGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHLQHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHVHFRPSDQLHV9RJHOVDQJ3±
In certain conditions, the operation of state-owned companies can help to stabilize eco-
nomic growth (for example, when they actively contribute to the implementation of govern-
ment “anti-crisis programs”). Recently, in a number of countries, tendencies have manifested 
themselves that seem to illustrate this effect. At the same time, the long-term existence of 
LOOGH¿QHGSURSHUW\ ULJKWV DQGRWKHUSROLWLFDO DQGHFRQRPLF IDFWRUV WKDW DUHGDPDJLQJ IRU
WKHEXVLQHVVFOLPDWHFDQUHVXOWLQDQRSHQHFRQRP\LQDPDVVLYHRXWÀRZRIFDSLWDODEURDG
 12 For the relationship between innovatory development and the search for new rent income in different periods of 
KLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPHQWVHH1RUWKHWDO
  'HVFULELQJVRPHRIWKHUHVXOWVRISULYDWL]DWLRQLQWKH(QJOLVKHFRQRP\'0DUWLPRUWHWDOQRWH³DQHZSULFH
FDSUHJLPHZDVDGRSWHGZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRILGHQWLI\LQJFOHDUO\SUR¿WOLQHVDQGORVVHV7KLVPRUHHI¿FLHQWPRGH
RIUHJXODWLRQZDVQRWDGRSWHGGXULQJWKH\HDUVRISXEOLFRZQHUVKLSDQGWKLVIDFWDSSHDUVDVDQHYLGHQFHRIDPRUH
SURQRXQFHGFDSWXUHLQSXEOLFRZQHUVKLS´0DUWLPRUWHWDO3
 $5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
This tendency was particularly marked in a number of countries, including Russia, following 
WKHHFRQRPLFFULVLVRI±,QVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVVWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVFDQDFW
as a type of “pillar”, creating conditions for a more stable (albeit in some circumstances not 
particularly effective) development of the economy as a whole. Even so, the experience of 
successful economic development in China shows that the existence of an extensive public 
sector does not detract from the need to radically improve the general investment climate 
and, in particular, conditions for the investment of foreign and domestic capital. 
State-owned companies necessarily face the need to coordinate their programs with over-
DOOJRYHUQPHQWVWUDWHJ\LQFOXGLQJ¿QDQFLDOVWUDWHJ\$QDO\]LQJWKHJHQHUDOVWUXFWXUHRIVWDWH
institutions, J. Tirole has correctly noted that state-owned enterprises have to obey at least two 
PDVWHUV³«DµVSHQGLQJPLQLVWU\¶ZLWKWKHPLVVLRQRIGHYHORSLQJWKHLQGXVWU\DQGD¿QDQFH
PLQLVWU\LQVWUXFWHGWRUHGXFHWKHEXGJHWGH¿FLW´7LUROH3,QFDVHVZKHUHVWDWH
RZQHGFRPSDQLHVDUHSDUWLFXODUO\VROLGO\HVWDEOLVKHGDFRQÀLFWRIWKHVHW\SHVRIREMHFWLYHV
can be attenuated by the allocation to them of generous funding facilities and by a substantial 
relaxation of central control over the expenditure of such resources.
For approximately thirty years, there has been a discussion in the theoretical literature of 
the subjects and mechanisms of management in this sphere. After all, if we consider the state-
owned company to be an “agent” called upon to implement political and economic tasks 
WKDWDUHVRLPSRUWDQWWKDWWKH\JHQHUDWHFRQÀLFWVQRWRQO\ZLWKWKH)LQDQFH0LQLVWU\EXWZLWK
a number of other ministries, then who, in this scheme of mutual subordination, acts as the 
³SULQFLSDO´"6HHIRUH[DPSOH/HY\$KDURQ\
1HZFRPSDQLHVRUJDQL]HGE\WKHVWDWHUHFHLYHSULYLOHJHGDFFHVVWRSUR¿WDEOHHFRQRPLFRSH
UDWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\WRH[SRUWFRQWUDFWVDQGWR³GH¿FLWRU\´FRPSRQHQWVRIWKHH[LVWLQJWUDQV-
port infrastructure, including pipelines, and they establish “special relationships” with the tax 
 authorities and others. As a result, the mode of operation of such companies assumes particular 
state-monopoly characteristics, even when other producers are operating in the same branch.
We would emphasize the following circumstance: In such conditions, the activity of state-
owned companies in effect avoids the constraints of the competitive environment and of mar-
ket discipline. In particular, their inability to make use of data that describe the competitive 
costs of production and of competitive prices deprives their managers of vital information 
relating to social demand and opportunities for effectively satisfying that demand. The role 
RIHVWLPDWHVDQGRIFDOFXODWLRQVWKDWGHVFULEHWKHVSHFL¿FLWLHVRIFXUUHQWHFRQRPLFSURFHVVHV
is taken over by value judgments, by prescribed tasks and by programs, “supported” by the 
ÀH[LEOHDVVHVVPHQWVRIH[SHUWV1R OHVVVLJQL¿FDQWDUH WKHPRWLYDWLRQDOSUREOHPV WKDWDUH
created and the mechanisms of collaboration that come into existence between individual 
economic subjects: The managers of state-owned companies are able, with impunity, to 
QHJOHFWVWUDWHJ\IRULQQRYDWLRQDQGRUIRUWKHORZHULQJRISURGXFWLRQFRVWV
The experience of state-owned companies in many countries demonstrates that when they 
succeed in reinforcing their unique position in the economy, then they and their top managers 
more often than not strive to achieve this by employing a variety of methods for the realiza-
WLRQRIUHQW7KHVHPHWKRGVDUHPRVWHYLGHQWLQWKH¿[LQJRISULFHVIRUWKHJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHV
that state companies deliver to the government or to particular ministries. In such cases, 
the competitive struggle is in essence replaced by competition of a different order — the 
company that possesses a comparatively greater administrative resource prevails. These fac-
tors can have a negative effect on the economic effectiveness of a company (or branch). 
  ,WLVVXI¿FLHQWWRUHIHUWRWKHUHVXOWVRIUHVHDUFKRQWKHSROLWLFDOFRQQHFWLRQVRIGLUHFWRUVRIVWDWHRZQHG
companies in Italy. Calculations show that companies whose directors had close connections with government 
FRQVLVWHQWO\GHPRQVWUDWHGDORZHUOHYHORIHI¿FLHQF\0DQR]]LHWDO7KHVWXGLHVRIVWDWHFRPSDQLHVLQWKH
People’s Republic of China (most of which are managed by local authorities) report a comparatively lower level of 
HI¿FLHQF\IRUFRPSDQLHVZKRVHPDQDJHPHQWKDVHVWDEOLVKHGFORVHOLQNVZLWKLQÀXHQWLDOSROLWLFDO¿JXUHV:XHWDO
)DQHWDO<RXDQG'X
$5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
,Q FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQZKLFK WKHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWV LQ WKHPDUNHWÀXFWXDWHV WKH LQHI¿-
ciency of state-owned companies inevitably results in a diminution of social welfare (see, for 
H[DPSOHɋDWR
We have already drawn attention to the particularities of public choice in situations when 
actors participating in decision-making exploit an administrative resource and promote the 
LQWHUHVWVRISDUWLFXODUUHJLRQVRUHQWUHSUHQHXUV+HUHWKHYHU\ORJLFRIFROOHFWLYHGHFLVLRQ
making (and the characteristics of Nash equilibrium associated with such decision-making 
in the relevant formal models15) guarantees a loss-makingRXWFRPHIRUWKHSURMHFWVDGRSWHG
consequently, the results promised by various state enterprises simply cannot be delivered in 
full. The actions of “bureaucrats” (including the senior managers of state-owned companies), 
who advocate as priority objectives an increase in the scale of activities and a maximization 
RI¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVSURGXFHDQDORJRXVUHVXOWV
7KH PDQDJHUV RI WKHVH FRPSDQLHV WHQG WR H[SODLQ WKH LQHI¿FLHQF\ RI WKHLU HFRQRPLF
manage ment in terms of the limited nature of the powers they have been given and of the 
LQVXI¿FLHQF\RIUHVRXUFHVDOORFDWHGWRWKHP7KH\WKHQVHHNWRUHVROYHWKHLUSUREOHPVE\H[-
panding their “economic empire”, with proposals for both horizontal and vertical integration. 
Efforts to “extract” and “appropriate” budget funds earmarked for the support of state-owned 
companies also play their part. One can easily show that in a number of cases, regional and 
municipal institutions responsible for transport infrastructure and communal services have 
found that the simplest means of “resolving problems” is to increase budgetary assignations 
and expand the volume of non-completed construction works, for example, the construction 
of transport and other means of communication. In such cases, it is usually possible to “bury” 
any trace of the misappropriation of local monopoly revenues.
The question of time-inconsistency merits particular attention with regard to both the 
gene ral development of the public sector and particular initiatives taken by state-owned com-
panies.Within political institutions, there are no real powers capable of ensuring a consis-
tent compliance by the government with the commitments it has undertaken. In the case of 
private agents, the state and, above all, legal institutions are required to monitor the imple-
mentation of contractual commitments and to impose sanctions in the event of non-comp-
OLDQFH+RZHYHULWLVIRUWKLVYHU\UHDVRQWKDWWKHUHFDQQRWH[LVWDPHFKDQLVPIRUHLWKHUWKH
automatic or discretionary enforcement of government commitments.
At the highest levels of the legislative and executive branches of government, where there 
is a regular turnover of personnel, tactical considerations of one type or another make for 
a recourse to socio-political maneuvering. State-owned companies inevitably become hos-
tage to this type of politics at a government level. Amongst the most frequent temptations 
in the regulation of the institutional structures of society include efforts to resolve complex 
problems by expanding the sphere of indirect government regulation and by creating new 
state-owned companies tasked with resolving these very problems. Thereafter, this type of 
company will naturally exploit every available method, including the effective technologies 
of “bureaucratic games”, to ensure its survival and, if possible, to strengthen its position. 
This can give rise to symptoms of “dynamic inconsistency”, whereby state-owned companies 
WKDWZHUHRSHUDWLQJRSWLPDOO\XQGHUSUHYLRXVFRQGLWLRQVFDQEHFRPHLQHI¿FLHQWDQGVHUYHDV
instruments for the dissipation of resources.
Risks associated with the state incorporation of private companies are increased by un-
FHUWDLQWLHVLQWKHUHDOPVRISURSHUW\ULJKWVDQGODZVRIFRQWUDFW7KHVHJLYHULVHVSHFL¿FDOO\
 15 We are referring to the comparative characteristics of different equilibria in game models describing the 
FRRUGLQDWLRQRIDFWLRQVZLWKLQVRFLHW\0\HUVRQ
  Noting this type of dynamic inconsistency between the setting of political objectives and the realization of these 
REMHFWLYHVZLWKSDUWLFXODUUHIHUHQFHWRPRQHWDU\SROLF\.\GODQGDQG3UHVFRWWKDYHLGHQWL¿HGWKHSUREOHPV
to which this gives rise. We would add that this type of inconsistency can also be present in circumstances where 
a political strategy, implemented over shorter time intervals, can be considered optimal. 
 $5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
to the “hold-up problem”. These risks can also measurably weaken the incentive to adopt 
long-term strategic planning and, in particular, to make additional capital investments. Some 
of the above issues are of relevance to Russia today.
3. Growth of the public sector and the palliatives of Russian privatization
'HVSLWHDUDGLFDOPDUNHWWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\GXULQJWKHVDQGWKH
rapid progress of privatization, at the end of that decade, the state in Russia retained a major 
SUHVHQFHLQPDQ\EUDQFKHVRIWKHHFRQRP\%\WKHVWDUWRIWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\WKHUHZDV
DVLJQL¿FDQWGHFHOHUDWLRQLQWKHUDWHRISULYDWL]DWLRQDQGWKLVKDGDOUHDG\EHFRPHQRWLFHDEOH
towards the end of the period of “mass” privatization. The “monetary” privatization of the 
VHFRQGKDOIRIWKHVDLPHGDWVXSSOHPHQWLQJEXGJHWUHYHQXHVDQGUHVWUXFWXULQJSURGXF-
WLRQE\HQFRXUDJLQJLQYHVWPHQWGLGQRWKDYHDVDWLVIDFWRU\RXWFRPH'XULQJWKHVWKH
process of reducing the volumes of property owned by state and municipal authorities con-
tinued, with varying degrees of intensity.
A more ambiguous measure of the place and role of the state sector emerges from the fact 
WKDWGXULQJWKHODVWGHFDGHWKHUHZDVQRFOHDUWHQGHQF\IRUWKHVWDWHVHFWRUWRGHFUHDVHLQVL]H
if anything, its dimensions increased if we take into account the processes of the formation of 
integrated structures involving state participation. The policy for securing the management 
of disparate state assets through the creation of holding companies emerged as early as the 
VZKHQLWZDVDSSOLHGLQWKHIXHODQGHQHUJ\VHFWRU'XULQJWKHVKROGLQJFRPSD-
QLHVZHUHIRUPHGSULPDULO\LQWKHGHIHQVHLQGXVWU\DQGGXULQJWKH\HDUV±LQWH-
grated structures were formed that encompassed entire branches of the economy (atomic and 
aviation industries, ship-building) and a segment of the output of civil production. The for-
PDWLRQGXULQJRIDVSHFL¿FLQVWLWXWLRQGHVLJQDWHGDVD³VWDWHFRUSRUDWLRQ´PDUNHG
a new stage in the development of integrated structures (see below).
According to a number of estimates, the share of the state in the market capitalization 
RI5XVVLDQ FRPSDQLHV GXULQJ WKH SHULRG ± RVFLOODWHG EHWZHHQ  DQG  EXW
in any case, it was dominant. According to an estimate for 2011, state-owned companies 
DFFRXQWHG IRU  RI WKH DJJUHJDWH FDSLWDO RI FRPSDQLHV LQFOXGHG LQ WKH 06&, LQGH[
7KH(FRQRPLVW36LJQL¿FDQWO\RQ$SULOHQWLWLHVZHUHUHJLV
tered with  RossimushchestvoZKLFKLVDSSUR[LPDWHO\RUWKRXVDQGPRUHWKDQ
RQ-DQXDU\HQWLWLHV$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHVWDWHSURSHUW\FRPSOH[DWWKH
IHGHUDO OHYHO FRQVLVWHG RI  HFRQRPLF VRFLHWLHV 2$2=$2222 DQG  )*83
)HGHUDO6WDWH8QLWDU\(QWHUSULVHVFRPSDUHGZLWK$2DQGXQLWDU\HQWHUSULVHVDW
WKHEHJLQQLQJRIDFFRUGLQJWRWKHQHZSULYDWL]DWLRQSURJUDPIRU±
,QWKHFXUUHQWµ&RQFHSWLRQIRUWKH/RQJ7HUP6RFLR(FRQRPLF'HYHORSPHQWRIWKH5XV-
sian Federation for the Period up to 2020’, the limits of the state sector for the contemporary 
5XVVLDQHFRQRP\DUHGH¿QHGDQGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIVWDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLSLVDFNQRZOHGJHG
7KH¿QDQFLDODQGHFRQRPLFFULVLVRI±SURPSWHGDGHEDWHRYHUWKHQHHGIRUDQHZ
³ELJSULYDWL]DWLRQ´DQGLQWKHFRXUVHRIWKLVGHEDWHWKHGLI¿FXOW\RIGH¿QLQJWKHOLPLWVRIWKH
state sector and issues relating to its management came to the fore. The announcement of the 
LQWHQWLRQWRLPSOHPHQWDQHZVWDJHRI³VWUXFWXUDOSULYDWL]DWLRQ´DVRIZDVWRDVLJQL¿-
FDQWGHJUHHLQÀXHQFHGE\DQDZDUHQHVVRIWKUHHIXQGDPHQWDOSUREOHPV
x the fact that during the crisis period, the participation of the state in the economy had in-
creased. This was now understood as being an undesirable consequence of the strengthen-
LQJRIWKHLQGLUHFWLQÀXHQFHRIWKHVWDWHRQWKHSURSHUW\UHODWLRQVRIVWDWHFRQWUROOHGEDQNV
and of structures that acted as agents of the state during the implementation of anti-crisis 
PHDVXUHV
x the low level of competitiveness of a number of large companies belonging to the state 
VHFWRUDQGWKHLUQHHGIRUUHVWUXFWXULQJDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOPRGHUQL]DWLRQ
x the limited competence of the state in managing state property (in its existing scale).
$5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
The new government program of the Russian Federation “Management of Federal Property ” 
DGRSWHGE\DGHFLVLRQRIWKH*RYHUQPHQWRIWKH5)RI)HEUXDU\1RUOLNHDO-
most all previous government documents concerning property relations, stresses the need to 
reduce as much as possible the participation of the state in the economy. It is at this point that 
a FRQÀLFWEHWZHHQGHFODUHGDLPVDQGUHDOLQWHUHVWVDULVHV
An increase in the participation of the state in the economy creates opportunities for the 
DSSURSULDWLRQRISULYDWHEHQH¿WV LQDYDULHW\RIIRUPV LQFOXGLQJVXEVWDQWLDO LQFRPHLQWKH
form of rent, and this (combined, of course, with other factors) can result in the development 
of a sort of external technical asymmetry in the behavior of the state. For example, propo-
sals for the de-nationalization of large enterprises necessarily result in lengthy procedures 
for discussion, coordination and preparation. At the same time, decisions for the creation of 
new “closed” state-owned companies or for the compulsory cartelization of government-
controlled enterprises and strategic branches of industry are addressed as “measures for im-
plementation” without being debated at the legislative level.
If we compare the processes that have governed nationalization during the past few de-
cades with processes that have governed privatization, we discover a marked asymmetry. 
+XJHVWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVRUDVVRFLDWLRQVWHQGWREHFUHDWHG³LQRQHIHOOVZRRS´LQPRVW
cases without preliminary public debate. In regard to privatization, the picture is very diffe-
rent. Fiscal and other positive advantages are debated for years on end (and still continue to 
the present day). Plans for the “partial privatization” of particular state-owned companies 
(enterprises) are deferred year after year and amended, often with the effect of negating the 
original purpose.
This asymmetry betrays a traditional attachment to administrative methods of management 
DQGFDQDOVRUHÀHFWWKHUHOXFWDQFHRIWKHUXOLQJpOLWHVQRWHGHDUOLHUWROHWJRRIWKHOHYHUVRI
power and lose the sources of income to which they have become accustomed. In the theoreti-
FDO OLWHUDWXUHRI WKHEHJLQQLQJRI WKH WZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\ZHHQFRXQWHU WKH WHUP³UHOXFWDQW
SULYDWL]DWLRQ´%RUWRORWWLDQG)DFFLR7KLVDWWLWXGHLVHQWLUHO\FRPSDWLEOHZLWKDVWXE-
born commitment (a form of inertia) actually to increase the role of the state in the economy.18
Frequently, this attitude is accompanied by what is known as the “short-sightedness ef-
fect”. The unpleasant consequences (for example, unemployment) of putting a company on 
a market footing are felt very rapidly: The number of unemployed individuals increases, and 
the wages of those who retain their jobs are reduced. The response in some cases has been 
a repeated extension of deadlines for privatization, accompanied by veiled allusions to the 
existence of “political constraints”. A. Ghosh and P. Sen, who devised a general equilibrium 
model for analyzing processes of the denationalization of the economy, have argued that an 
optimal solution to this particular problem would be to accompany privatization with a sig-
QL¿FDQWUHGXFWLRQRIWKHEDUULHUVWKDWKLQGHUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOPRYHPHQWRIJRRGVDQGFDSLWDO
(Ghosh and Sen, 2012).
0HDVXUHVIRUWKHUHRUJDQL]DWLRQRISURGXFWLRQDQGLPSURYHPHQWLQHFRQRPLFHI¿FLHQF\
have been in train for an even longer period, and usually, they are bound up with other 
³EDFNJURXQG´PHDVXUHV+RZHYHUWKHJRYHUQPHQWGRHVQRWJRRXWRILWVZD\WRVWLPXODWH
a broad-ranging debate as to why state property has to be retained in one form or another in 
so-called strategic companies.
Many projects for the selling-off of strategic blocks of shares include a condition for the 
retention of a “golden share” by the state. In most cases, the limits of the state prerogative 
  6HH IRU H[DPSOH5DG\JLQ 0HJJLQVRQ%HUJK DQG+HQUHNVRQ (VWULQ HW DO 
%RUWRORWWLDQG6LQLVFDOɫR5RODQG
 18 )RUIXUWKHUGHWDLOVHH5DG\JLQDQG(QWRY
  ³,¿QG LW VXUSULVLQJ WKDWSULYDWL]DWLRQDGYLVHUVRU LQWHUQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW DJHQFLHVRIWHQGRQRW FKDOOHQJH
or question governments when they classify a long list of companies as strategic and plan to keep them in state 
RZQHUVKLS´$QGHUVRQ3
 $5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
DUHLOOGH¿QHGDQGOHJDOERGLHVWHQGWRUHVROYHGLVSXWHVLQIDYRURIWKHH[HFXWLYH$OORIWKLV
provides civil servants with ample opportunities to impose their own preferences (restric-
tions) when management decisions have to be made. Research has shown that the retention of 
D³JROGHQVKDUH´E\WKHVWDWHKDVKDGDQHJDWLYHHIIHFWXSRQWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIFRUSRUDWHJRYHU-
QDQFHLQ³PL[HG´FRPSDQLHVVHHIRUH[DPSOH%RULVRYDHWDO,WLVIDUIURPWKHFDVH
WKDWWKHW\SHVRI³UHOXFWDQWSULYDWL]DWLRQ´WKDWZHKDYHPHQWLRQHGWRDQ\VLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHH
HQKDQFH WKH VWDWXV RI WKLV DSSURDFK+RZ HI¿FLHQW LV WKH DFWLYLW\ RI FRPSDQLHVZKHUH WKH
VWDWHKDVUHWDLQHGWKHSUHGRPLQDQWRUDVLJQL¿FDQWVKDUHRISURSHUW\DQGFRQWURO"(PSLULFDO
research shows that the retention of a preponderant number of shares by the state, following 
WKLVW\SHRI³SULYDWL]DWLRQ´KDVLQPDQ\FDVHVVLJQL¿FDQWO\KHOGEDFNWKHJURZWKRIHI¿FLHQF\
VHH%RXEDNULHWDO0DQLIHVWDWLRQVRI³UHOXFWDQWSULYDWL]DWLRQ´DUHPRVWIUHTXHQWLQ
developing countries, where governments, for reasons that can be understood, are particularly 
DSSUHKHQVLYHDERXWWKHHIIHFWRIPDUNHWIRUFHVXSRQWKHLQZDUGDQGRXWZDUGÀRZVRIFDSLWDO
5HWXUQLQJWRWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ5XVVLDOHWXVQRWHWKDWWKH\HDUV±ZLWQHVVHGDFRQ-
siderable degree of activity in the sphere of privatization.20 At the same time, proposals for 
bringing some order into the growth of the state sector and for the referral of any initiatives 
in that direction to a “red zone” of economic policy21¿JXUHGRQO\DVLQWHQWLRQVLQWKHSUR-
JUDPGRFXPHQWVRI±DQGZLWKSULYDWL]DWLRQDVLGHWKH\KDYHQRWIRXQGWKHLUZD\
LQWRODZ+RZHYHUTXHVWLRQVVXFKDVWKHQHHGIRUWKHGLVDJJUHJDWLRQRIFRQJORPHUDWHVWDWH
structures (the separation of holdings), the removal of non-core assets from them, the setting 
of legislative limits on the formation of state-integrated structures in the future, the acquisi-
tion of new assets by state-owned companies and structures dependent upon them, and in 
particular their participation in privatization as buyers remain relevant today.
With regard to the largest Russian companies, for a considerable time, there has been 
a debate over the “safest” approach from the standpoint of the interests of the administrative 
leadership, i.e., that of selling a certain quantity of the shares of privatized companies to pri-
vate buyers while retaining a manifestly preponderant number of normal (voting) shares for 
the state. This would mean that receiving dividends (and current income) would be strictly 
demarcated from rights of governance and control over the activity of the company, which, 
as before, would remain with the state.
An important feature of the privatization program adopted in November 2010 for the 
SHULRG±ZDVWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIJURXSVRI WKHODUJHVWFRPSDQLHVGHHPHGWREH
of national economic importance, in relation to which such measures could be adopted on 
the basis of special decisions of the President of the RF and of the RF Government (with the 
participation of investment consultants in the organization of the sale of shares). The initial 
program covered 10 such companies: 5RVQHIW5XVK\GUR)6.6RYNRPÀRW5=K', the United 
*UDLQ&RPSDQ\ 2=.Rosagroleasing, VTB, Sberbank and Rosselkhozbank. The inten-
tion was to sell, in most cases, holdings of blocking and minority shares. In 2012, there was 
a serious radicalization of privatization plans for the largest companies: additions to the list 
RIFRPSDQLHVWREHSULYDWL]HGDVLJQL¿FDQWUHGXFWLRQLQWKHVKDUHRIWKHVWDWHLQWKHLUFDSLWDO
DQGWKHWHUPLQDWLRQRIVWDWHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHFDSLWDORIDOOFRPSDQLHVXQWLODQGWKH
right to have a decisive vote (“the golden share”) in a number of them was granted. In the 
QHZSULYDWL]DWLRQSURJUDPIRUWKHSHULRG±DGRSWHGLQSULYDWL]DWLRQSODQV
IRUWKHODUJHVWFRPSDQLHVRQFHDJDLQXQGHUZHQWVLJQL¿FDQWPRGL¿FDWLRQEXWWKLVWLPHLQWKH
 20 :HUHIHUWRWKHIROORZLQJOHJLVODWLYHLQQRYDWLRQVWKH)HGHUDO/DZRI0D\1R)=³2QDPHQGPHQWV
WR WKH)HGHUDO/DZ µ2Q WKHSULYDWL]DWLRQRI VWDWH DQGPXQLFLSDO SURSHUW\RI WKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ¶´ WKH VWDWH
SURJUDPRIWKH5)³7KHPDQDJHPHQWRIIHGHUDOSURSHUW\´IRUWKHSHULRG±FRQ¿UPLQJWKHGLUHFWLYHRIWKH
*RYHUQPHQWRIWKH5)RI)HEUXDU\1RUSROLWLFDOVWDWHPHQWVRQWKHQHHGWRVSHHGXSWKHSURFHVVRI
SULYDWL]DWLRQLQQRYDWLRQVLQWURGXFHGLQWKHVSKHUHRIHOHFWURQLFWUDGLQJDQGLQWKHSODQIRUGUDIWLQJWKHVWUDWHJ\IRU
)*83WKHUHPRYDORIVWDWHRI¿FLDOVIURPERDUGVRIGLUHFWRUVDQGDGGLWLRQVWRPHWKRGVIRUWUDQVIRUPLQJXQLWDU\
enterprises.
21 6HHIRUH[DPSOH0DXDQG.X]PLQRY9RO&K3±
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í
RSSRVLWHGLUHFWLRQ+RZHYHUWKHOLVWRIDVVHWVGHVLJQDWHGIRUSULYDWL]DWLRQUHPDLQHGEDVLFDOO\
WKHVDPH(YHQVRLQFRPSDULVRQZLWKWKHSULYDWL]DWLRQSURJUDPIRU±DUHGXFWLRQ
in the share of the Russian Federation in the basic statutory capital of many of the largest 
FRPSDQLHVHQYLVDJHVDUHWHQWLRQRIFRUSRUDWHFRQWUROWKDWLVWKHDELOLW\WRLQÀXHQFHWKHSUR-
cesses of corporate governance, by means of the ownership of a blocking shareholding (25% 
of shares plus one).
Of course, the issue here is not only that of “reluctant privatization”, at least as far as 
the largest companies are concerned: We are also handling the manifestation during the last 
decade of an emerging asymmetry between the processes of state incorporation and those of 
privatization. Without examining in detail the entire spectrum of related circumstances and 
PRWLYHVOHWXVFRQVLGHUWKHULVNVWKDWUHODWHWRWKHSHULRG±IROORZLQJDVHULHVRI
RI¿FLDOGHFODUDWLRQVOHJLVODWLYHLQLWLDWLYHVDQGQHZORQJWHUPSURJUDPVDLPHGDWDFFHOHUDWLQJ
the processes of privatization. These are:22
x a systemically ambivalent and contradictory attitude towards the role of the state (as legis-
ODWXUHDQGDUHJXODWRUDQGGLUHFWVKDUHKROGHURIFRPSDQLHV
x an expansion of the autonomy and interpretative discretion of the law enforcement agen-
FLHVLQUHJDUGWRHYDOXDWLQJWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRISULYDWHDQGVWDWHRZQHG
economic subjects. This places severe external constraints upon all initiatives and innovative 
PHDVXUHVRQWKHSDUWRIJRYHUQPHQWDXWKRULWLHVLQFOXGLQJLQWKHVSKHUHRISULYDWL]DWLRQ
x an expansion of the state (and quasi-state) sector, notwithstanding the continuation of the 
SULYDWL]DWLRQSURFHVVDQGWKHSHQHWUDWLRQRIWKHVWDWHVHFWRULQWRWKHFRPSHWLWLYHDUHQD
x the inadequate development of conditions for fair competition, including the enhancement 
of the investment activity of private business in sectors with a high level of state participa-
tion and, conversely, a low level of competitive potential of a number of large companies 
WKDWEHORQJWRWKHVWDWHVHFWRU
x a disparity between the ambitious plans for privatization that have been announced and 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFDSDELOLWLHVDQGVRXUFHVRIIXQGLQJWKDWDUHDYDLODEOH
x the particular role played by political decisions, notably a distinct periodicity in the 
VWUHQJWKHQLQJRUZHDNHQLQJRIWKHLQÀXHQFHRI³LQWHUHVWJURXSV´XSRQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
in the sphere of privatization. Such rivalries damage the decisions that are made and make 
IRULQFRPSOHWHDQGFRQWUDGLFWRU\LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
x a substantial risk that the existing model of management of state property will be pre-
served. In this event, any measures adopted would be mere palliatives, and the effective-
ness of whatever denationalization measures were adopted in the future would be under-
mined.
Judging from all of the evidence, we can state that privatization as it is being implemented 
in Russia today (within the framework of the national economy) has become a purely techni-
FDOSURFHVVWKHG\QDPLFVRIZKLFKGRQRWUHÀHFWWKHTXDOLWDWLYHDQGTXDQWLWDWLYHG\QDPLFVRI
the development of the state-owned sector. This means that the evaluation of the role of the 
state sector (state-owned companies) in property relations must be viewed from a particular 
perspective, one that bears a closer relation to “political markets”, making all due allowances 
for the application of this term to the present-day Russian realities.
4. “State corporation”: What does the future hold?
Seven years have passed since state corporations (SC) actively began to be formed in Rus-
VLD,WLVGLI¿FXOWWRSURYLGHDVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFHLIRQO\EHFDXVH
of the profound differences that exist between them. The formation of each individual SC 
has served as a means of overcoming contradictions between certain priorities for economic 
GHYHORSPHQWGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQWUDQVLWLRQWRDQLQQRYDWLRQEDVHGIRUPRIGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKH
 22 For further detail, see, for example, Radygin et al., 2011.
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limited mechanisms available to the state for overcoming these contradictions, the low cali-
ber of the administrative apparatus, and the particularities of a system of state management 
oriented primarily towards the solution of current and traditional problems. Even so, we can 
draw a number of conclusions that can serve to guide future policy and identify a number of 
institutional “traps”.
*LYHQWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIVXEVWDQWLDO¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVWRWKHVWDWHDGHEDWHWRRNSODFH
during the pre-crisis period over the need to utilize these resources to stimulate economic 
development. This circumstance strengthened the position of those who favored a more ac-
tive and direct participation of the state in the economy and who extolled the advantages of 
DSURMHFWDSSURDFKRYHUDQLQVWLWXWLRQDORQH7KHFUHDWLRQRIWKH6&EHFDPHWRDVLJQL¿FDQW
GHJUHHDQLQVWUXPHQWRISUHYHQWLYH³LQVWLWXWLRQDO¿[DWLRQ´FUHDWLQJDIUDPHZRUNIRUHPEHG-
GLQJDQXPEHURISULRULWLHVLQWKHFRQGXFWRIJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\DQGIRUWKHSHUVRQL¿FDWLRQ
of accountability — this is made clear in the individual legislative status of each SC. This 
explains the allocation to some of them of a substantial amount of property, of long term 
¿QDQFHDQGDOVRWKHHOHYDWHGSRVLWLRQWKH\ZHUHJUDQWHGLQWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHKLHUDUFK\
The organizational-legal form of the SC was chosen largely because it provided greater 
ÀH[LELOLW\LQWKHXWLOL]DWLRQRI¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVDQGVLPSOL¿HGDFFHOHUDWHGWKHSURFHVVHV
of restructuring and consolidating state property in particular sections of the economy. The 
formation of each SC served as a precedent in the working out of new approaches to the 
formation and expansion of the activity of developmental institutions (Vneshekonombank, 
ROSNANO), for improving outcomes in the delivery of state programs, in the execution 
of particular state functions (Olimpstroi, the Fund for Supporting the Reform of Communal 
Services), and in the allocation to particular state authorities of responsibility for particular 
strategic objectives (Rostekhnologii — now Rostekh, Rosatom).
The formation of the SC was severely criticized by the expert community and by repre-
VHQWDWLYHVRIWKHVWDWHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ7KUHHW\SHVRIFRQFHUQVZHUHH[SUHVVHG7KH¿UVWWKH
OHDVWLPSRUWDQWGHSORUHGWKHJURZWKRIGLUHFWVWDWHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHHFRQRP\WKHVHFRQG
objected to the concentration of decision making in individuals and the extension of the 
PRGHORIPDQXDORUDGKRFFRQWUROE\WKHVWDWHWKHWKLUGWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWFULWLFLVPQRWHG
the inadequacy of the legal-organizational form of the SC.
:KHQWKHUHJXODWLRQRIWKHDFWLYLW\RIWKH6&ZDVFRPSOHWHGE\WKHHQGRIPDQ\
problems and defects became apparent: These related primarily to the fact that many of their 
WDVNVDQGIXQFWLRQVKDGEHHQGH¿QHGLQLVRODWLRQIURPHDFKRWKHUWRWKHZHDNQHVVRIPHFKD-
QLVPV IRU LQWHUQDO FRQWURO WR WKH ODFN RI WUDQVSDUHQF\ LQ ERWKPDQDJHPHQW DQG¿QDQFLDO
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGWRWKHDEVHQFHRISURFHGXUHVIRUWKHUHVROXWLRQRIFRQÀLFWVRILQWHUHVW
between members of management bodies. In practice, the management of the largest state 
assets that had been handed over to SC was handled in a manual regime. Owing to the exces-
sively general and structurally fragmentary nature of the laws that had been adopted in setting 
up the SC and to the low caliber of their legislative reglamentation, the following problems 
DURVHGHOD\VIURPWKHRXWVHWLQWKHUHDOZRUNRIWKH6&LQLPSOHPHQWLQJWKHLUEDVLFWDVNVDQ
H[WHQVLRQRIRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRU³VKDGRZ´OREE\LQJE\YDULRXVLQWHUHVWJURXSVDULVNRI³FRQ-
MXQFWXUDOLVP´LQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDWWKHH[SHQVHRIVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJDQGFRQVLVWHQF\DQG
apprehension in business circles, sometimes involving a hyperbolic estimation of the risks 
involved in working with the SC.
&KDQJHVLQWKHOHJLVODWLRQJRYHUQLQJWKH6&LQ±ZHUHDLPHGSULPDULO\DW¿[LQJ
WKHGH¿FLHQFLHVDQGRPLVVLRQVRIWKHOHJLVODWLRQRI7KHLQQRYDWLRQVRI±VLJ-
QL¿FDQWO\LPSURYHGWKHOHJDOUHJXODWLRQRIWKH6&ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHWUDQVSDUHQF\RI¿QDQ-
FLDODFWLYLW\DQGWKHUHZHUHLPSURYHGPHDVXUHVIRUPRQLWRULQJWKHLUDFWLYLW\+RZHYHUWKH
fundamental anomalies inherent in the model of “corporation” that had been adopted were 
QRWHOLPLQDWHGDQGWKHULVNVRIFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKRVHVWDWHRI¿FLDOVZKRKDG
been appointed to management positions were not reduced. The absence of transparency in 
the appointment of the management personnel of the SC was not attended to.
$5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
In our opinion, the emphasis in the criticism of the SC was misplaced. The main problems 
resided not in the inadequacy of the legal-organizational form but in the fundamental in-
adequacies of the management of the state sector. The replacement of the SC by other forms 
of organization of public law, by a more effective form of SC such as “state company”, would 
amount to be no more than a charade, a formal shying away from the controversial term 
“state corporation”.
In general, at the present time, with a number of exceptions, one can talk of the existence 
of a single legal-organizational form of a non-commercial organization that carries out a va-
riety of socially important activities based on state property, which is under state control but 
which is not a “corporation”. The “state company” model is practically indistinguishable 
IURPWKH6&PRGHOWKXVLWVHPHUJHQFHFDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDQGHYHQ
less an evolution of the SC model. There has been a proposal for the introduction of a “public 
legal company” and for the legal regulation of its activity, but in essence, this would merely 
be a renaming of the SC and state company and would not involve any substantive changes 
to the existing model. Even the transformation of the SC into a joint-stock company would 
not resolve the fundamental problems and contradictions that arise in the management of 
state property.
3ULRUWRWKHFULVLVRI±WKH6&LQJHQHUDOVXFFHHGHGXSWRDSRLQWLQLPSURYLQJ
the quality of corporate governance, introducing a strategic dimension (programming) into 
their work and enhancing the transparency of the principles and outcomes of their activity. 
7KH\FDUULHGRXWWKHLUZRUNLQFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHJRDOVWKH\KDGEHHQVHW+RZHYHUZLWK
the onset of the economic crisis, the government made increasing demands of the SC to as-
sume executive functions as agents for the implementation of anti-crisis measures, and their 
functions as institutions of development receded into the background. An increase in the 
forms and in the scale of the agency functions of the SC was accompanied by a decline in 
the systematic nature and transparency of their activity and by a narrowing of the circle of 
VWDNHKROGHUVZKRH[HUFLVHGUHDOLQÀXHQFHLQWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVV
+RZHYHUWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKHFULVLVRI±RQWKHSRVWFULVLVGLUHFWLRQRIWKHGH-
velopment of the SC was not one-sided. For one thing, one of the pronouncements made at 
a government level was that the state sector was excessively large, that there was a need for 
contraction, and that investments should be sought to support structural change. The impor-
tance of encouraging innovation to improve competitiveness was acknowledged, as was the 
need for mechanisms to stimulate innovation and to perfect the system of state institutions 
of development. On the other hand, the work of some SC during the crisis (in particular, 
Vneshekonombank) and their contribution in implementing anti-crisis measures were appre-
ciated. This provided ammunition to the supporters of manual control, notably during the 
SKDVHRIPRGHUQL]DWLRQDQGSRVWFULVLVGHYHORSPHQW9DULDWLRQVLQJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\GXULQJ
the post-crisis period have manifested themselves most clearly at the level of the SC because 
each considers itself to be in some way an exception, and the likelihood of diverging from 
“mainstream” policy is, in their case, particularly high.
For example, both Vneshekonombank DQG5261$12DUH¿QDQFLDO GHYHORSPHQWDO LQ-
stitutions, but their paths of development have diverged. Vneshekonombank has preserved 
its former gravitational model — attracting additional functions — with compact and opera-
tional control on the side of the government. It has become an important instrument for the 
implementation of political-economic tasks within the system of overall state administration, 
a mechanism for the launching of major projects with all associated risks. The question of 
dividing Vneshekonombank into subsidiary institutions has been put off until the indetermi-
nate future.
ROSNANO has developed along different lines. Even before it was transformed into 
a joint-stock company, this SC was active in outsourcing a number of its functions and in 
creating a number of subsidiaries. Following upon its transformation, it immediately began 
to attract capital and invite private investors. Another example is the SC Rostekh%RWKEHIRUH
 $5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
and during the crisis, it actively sought to acquire additional functions and assets. After the 
crisis, it made a priority of capitalizing its sub-holdings (even admitting private investments 
into a number of them).
,W LVGLI¿FXOW WRSURYLGHDQXQDPELJXRXVDVVHVVPHQWRI WKHHFRQRPLFHIIHFWRI WKH6&
Government approaches to the stimulation of growth have varied, but even the very forma-
tion of SC remains controversial: Some commentators have serious doubts about the need 
IRUVXFKVHSDUDWHLQVWUXPHQWVIRUWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRIJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\RWKHUVSXWIRUZDUG
DUJXPHQWVLQIDYRURIWKHPWKDWODFND¿UPEDVH
The results of their activity are even more dubious. Certainly, three to four years ago, our 
own assessments were more neutral: We indicated that there would be both opportunities and 
ULVNVDQGWKDWWKHVHZHUHPRUHRUOHVVLQEDODQFH+RZHYHUZHKDYHQRZUHDFKHGWKHFRQFOX-
sion that many of the risks have realized and that serious problems and disproportions have 
arisen, whereas few of the available opportunities have been taken.
*LYHQDQRYHUORDGHGV\VWHPRIVWDWHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGDODFNRIÀH[LELOLW\LQWKHXVHRI
budgetary resources, the SC have become a magnet for the transfer of additional tasks and 
functions, and this has led to an increase in demands by the SC for additional resources. It has 
turned out not to be possible to place limits on the growth in the size of the SC. The SC have 
served as a new, elevated springboard for the ambitions of institutions and of individuals. 
7KHULVNWKDWWKH6&ZRXOGDFWLYHO\DQGVXFFHVVIXOO\OREE\IRUDGGLWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV
has been realized. Practically all SC, irrespective of their special function, have acquired 
resources in addition to the initial state investment. They have exploited their ele vated status 
to acquire additional powers and functions as processes of consultation and decision-making 
with state representatives have become even less transparent. The opportunities for competi-
WLRQDQGH[WHUQDODXGLWVKDYHEHFRPHYHU\UHVWULFWHGGXHWRWKHVSHFL¿FLW\RIWKHIXQFWLRQV
of each SC and the “reciprocity” of audits — the representatives of one SC will assess the 
performance of another and vice versa, and thus is formed a closed circle of assessors.
The most negative effect of the activity of the SC is the growing conviction that this is 
a normal and convenient instrument for the implementation of government economic policy. 
A consequence is a weakening of pressure for the development of the institutional environ-
ment. Government authorities have become less active in their efforts to improve the indirect 
instruments for stimulating socio-economic development. The best example concerns the 
regulation of state procurements and investments and the drafting and implementation of 
Federal targeted programs. At one time, problems in this area necessitated the creation of the 
SC Olimpstroi. The process of reform of regulation has now come to a halt, and many ques-
tions hang over the operation of the Federal system of procurement.
The creation of the SC was bound up with hopes for drafting and implementation of an 
HFRQRPLFSROLF\WKDWZRXOGEHJHDUHGWRZDUGVGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQDQGLQQRYDWLRQ7KHVHKRSHV
KDYHEHHQUHDOL]HGRQO\LQSDUWSULPDULO\LQWKHVSKHUHRIGHYHORSPHQWDOLQVWLWXWLRQV%RWK
Vneshekonombank and ROSNANO have acquired a reputation for their work in the forma-
tion of economic policy and have put forward proposals for improving the system of regula-
WLRQ+RZHYHUWKHFRRSWDWLRQRI6&LQWRWKHSURFHVVRIIRUPDWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
government policy, without any change in the methods of consultation and decision-making 
that are customary within the system of state administration, has resulted in the creation of 
DQHZEXUHDXFUDF\WKHZRUNRIZKLFKLVWRDVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHHQRWUHJXODWHG
A number of improvements that we considered to be important have not come to pass, 
for example, greater autonomy, less dependence on the political conjuncture, and long-term 
planning. On the contrary, the concentration of different types of resources within the SC, 
their elevated status and their operational potential have transformed them into an arena for 
inter-institutional struggle, and government representatives have come to look upon the SC 
as a means of achieving short-term objectives.
7KHUHKDVEHHQQRVLJQL¿FDQWSURJUHVVLQWKHVSKHUHRISXEOLFSULYDWHSDUWQHUVKLSOHDVW
RIDOOLQWKHGH¿QLWLRQRISULRULWLHVDQGRIPHFKDQLVPVIRUFRRSHUDWLRQRQWKHFRQWUDU\WKH
$5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
system of state administration has enforced its own “preferences” in this sphere. Finally, 
ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHSHUVRQL¿FDWLRQRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\IRUWKHDWWDLQPHQWRIGHYHORSPHQWJRDOV
although there have been some advances in the case of some SC, these have been due more 
to the previous experience of managers than to the performance of the institutions for which 
they are responsible.
Of course, if there are to be improvements in the effectiveness of the SC, a number of 
changes have to be introduced that will not be mere palliatives. Given that any transformation 
RIWKH6&ZLOOQRWWDNHSODFHTXLFNO\DQGZLOOLQYROYHVLJQL¿FDQWH[SHQGLWXUHZHSURSRVH
here a number of mechanisms for improving their performance in the medium term.
1. A system for setting limits on the growth of the SC must be established. Any proposals 
for the acquisition of additional functions or goals must be subjected to a comparison with 
alternative means of achieving the same objectives. Rules for the regular, say, annual assess-
ment of the performance of the SC in relation to the “failures” of the market or of the state 
must be agreed, and projects that could be realized without the participation of the SC must 
be handed over to other enterprises.
2. A key measure for the assessment of the performance of the SC must be the analysis 
of their effect on the market environment, conditions for competition, and entrepreneurial 
LQLWLDWLYH7KH6&PXVWQRWEHJLYHQWRWDO¿QDQFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUSDUWLFXODUSURMHFWV7KLV
provides grounds for the state to grant additional investments and, given the inadequacy of 
the extent of their interaction and partnership with private businesses, makes for an increas-
ing distortion of the markets and for an increase in the number and seriousness of “market 
failures” rather than the reverse. It also makes for a growth of the direct participation of 
WKHVWDWHLQWKHHFRQRP\/RQJWHUPFRQVLGHUDWLRQVDUHLPSRUWDQWLQWKLVUHVSHFW$WRWDORU
almost total “blocking” of free access to a branch of industry has the effect of impeding its 
optimal functioning and above all inhibits the potential for innovation.
7KHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKH6&KDVEHHQLPSURYHGE\WKHXVHRIDJHQF\VFKHPHVWKHXVH
RIWKH³IXQGRIIXQGV´PRGHODQGE\SURMHFWVIRUFRRSHUDWLQJZLWKWKHUHJLRQV+HUHWKHUH
are opportunities for combining resources and competencies and for clamping down on the 
RSSRUWXQLVPRIPDQDJHUV'UDZLQJXSDW\SRORJ\RIWKLVW\SHRIFRRSHUDWLRQDQGWKHFUHDWLRQ
of a legal framework will facilitate the exchange of best practice and encourage competition 
to achieve the best results.
3URFHGXUHVIRUFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH6&DQGWKHVWDWHPXVWEHFOHDUO\GH¿QHG7KH\
must be given the type of autonomy that will enable them to make decisions irrespective of 
the political conjuncture and to pursue strategic objectives without apprehension over pos-
sible changes in management or state representation. This autonomy must not increase the 
risk of the unaccountable expenditure of the resources of the SC. Therefore, in the system of 
external control, the audit of the utilization of resources must be replaced by the audit of the 
quality of realization of strategic goals. 
5. It would make sense to extend to the SC all substantive changes in the management of 
joint-stock companies with state participation. In particular, the objective appraisal of the 
SHUIRUPDQFHRIWKH6&ZRXOGEHQH¿WIURPWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRILQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRUVWRWKHLU
supervisory councils. It would also be useful to draw up within the SC plans for the develop-
ment and improvement of their performance and evaluate these according to the procedures 
that are used in joint-stock companies with state participation.
In our opinion, there is an urgent need for more decisive action in the transformation of 
the SC. Following a period of fairly intensive and productive improvements in the quality of 
corporate governance in the SC, and after a number of amendments and supplements to the 
/DZRQ1RQ&RPPHUFLDO2UJDQL]DWLRQVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUIXUWKHUHYROXWLRQDU\LPSURYHPHQW
in the performance of state corporations has been largely exhausted. The SC, exercising 
  Some analysts consider this to be amongst the most important arguments in favor of the privatization of state 
FRPSDQLHVVHHIRUH[DPSOH$QGHUVRQHWDO
 $5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
their functions as institutions of development, must be transformed into joint-stock com-
panies, and strategic private investors should be encouraged to participate in their capital. 
7KLVZRXOGQRWSUHFOXGHWKHVWDWHIURPUHWDLQLQJDVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHHRISDUWLFLSDWLRQIRU
some period of time.) SC that have short-term functions should be wound up or, in circum-
stances where their performance has been positive, transformed into joint-stock companies 
and then privatized. Finally, the performance of SC that have been given agency functions 
should be analyzed with reference to the legal barriers that they were set up to overcome. 
On this basis, clear and regulated plans for the improvement of the institutional environ-
ment should be drawn up. At a later date, these SC can be wound up, transformed into other 
forms, and privatized.
In transforming the SC, the creation of monopolies should be avoided, as should any ex-
cessive concentration of particular functions. To this end, it is essential that the rationale for 
dividing the SC into separate problem-oriented enterprises and measures for the transforma-
tion of the SC must be linked to institutional changes in the relevant spheres or sectors. The 
FRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVWRSULYDWL]DWLRQSROLF\VKRXOGEHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW
5. “Private state-owned companies”
The existence of various structures, de jure under state control (SC, various verti-
cally integrated structures, strategic enterprises and associations, various enterprises in 
the mixed sector) provides an important, though not complete, picture of the role of the 
VWDWHVHFWRULQDVSHFL¿FLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW7KHUHLVQRQHHGLQWKHSUHVHQWDUWLFOH
to discuss the raison d’être of a substantial (at least quantitatively) state sector or of its 
role in delivering public goods and “global public goods”, in compensating for “system 
IDLOXUHV´DQGLQFDWHULQJIRUJHRSROLWLFDOLQWHUHVWVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHVSHFL¿FFRQGL-
tions of the national economy. This belongs also to the discussion of the prevailing model 
of state capitalism, the stages of its development and the particularities after the crisis 
SHULRGRI±
$VLQRWKHUFRXQWULHVWKDWSRVVHVVDODUJHVWDWHVHFWRUDQGRUFRXQWULHVWKDWDUHSURFHHGLQJ
along the path to state capitalism), in Russia, the formation of large state companies and their 
transfer to substantial resources (assets) would not have been possible without the ascrip-
tion to them (often concealed from society) of ambitious objectives (including geo-political 
RQHV+RZHYHULPSUHFLVLRQLQWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHIXQFWLRQVJLYHQWRVWDWHRZQHGFRPSD-
nies and uncertainty as to the qualitative results that they were to achieve have prevented 
them from acquiring rational performance indicators. It is sometimes argued that accelerating 
the transmission of resources to compensate for “market failures” can almost automatically 
SURGXFHSRVLWLYHH[WHUQDOLWLHV+RZHYHUDQHPSKDVLVRQWKHDFTXLVLWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVFUHDWHV
a predisposition towards rent-seeking behavior on the part of recipients. Such a policy in-
hibits the motivation to produce the type of demonstration effects that will serve to attract 
SULYDWHLQYHVWPHQW$VDUHVXOWVWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVDFFXPXODWHVLJQL¿FDQWULVNVIRUWKH
LQHI¿FLHQWH[SHQGLWXUHRIUHVRXUFHVDQGJHQHUDWHDQHHGIRUDGGLWLRQDOUHVRXUFHVWREHDOOR-
cated to themselves.
The example considered above (of the formation of the SC — one of the most resource-
hungry forms) represents only one form of their evolution. The process of the formation of 
integrated structures with state participation has been underway for some time, and the net-
ZRUNRIVWDWHRZQHG¿QDQFLDOGHYHORSPHQWDOLQVWLWXWLRQVKDVEHHQH[SDQGLQJ7KHDFWLYLWLHV
of these institutions are for the most part aimed at compensating both for “market failures” 
(Vneshekonombank,DVWKH'HYHORSPHQW%DQNVHUYHVWKLVSXUSRVHDQGIRU³VWDWHIDLOXUHV´
(the Skolkovo Foundation is the prime example). Although Russian developmental institu-
  6HHIRUH[DPSOH5DG\JLQ.RQGUDWLHY1DWLRQDO,QWHOOLJHQFH&RXQFLO3±%UHPPHU
0XVDFFKLRDQG/D]]DULQL7KH(FRQRPLVW
$5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
tions have delivered a number of positive results, the poverty of demonstration effects — that 
is, of effects on external behavior — is evident (see Simachev et al., 2012b)25.
Efforts to solve institutional problems by means of direct state involvement in the eco-
QRP\DQGE\WKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQRI¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVSURGXFHVRQO\WHPSRUDU\EHQH¿WVDQG
from a strategic point of view, they generate a tightly knit and stubborn set of problems: 
Exceptional measures, intended to be temporary, for the creation of state-owned companies 
(“national champions”) came to be regarded as positive practice and as an integral part of 
an active government policy. Motivation to improve the institutional environment is further 
weakened, and the inclination towards, and habit of, a direct intervention of the state in the 
pursuit of economic development is strengthened. In all of this, the question of the role of the 
legislative, executive and legal branches of the state in consolidating private property rights 
merits special consideration, as does their role in supporting a favorable investment climate.
In the meantime, civilized property relations are being eroded, as are opportunities for the 
attainment of private property rights, given the expansion of the state sector de jure and de 
facto. In our opinion, the concept “private state-owned companies” (albeit a contradiction in 
terms) best sums up these processes insofar as in the Russian economy of the present day, 
it makes little sense to distinguish between the two categories. There have been a number of 
developments in this area.
1. The expansion of state entrepreneurship causes the re-emergence in some sectors of the 
economy of the old state-based power relations between entrepreneurs. They drive decentra-
lized, market forms of cooperation into the background and discriminate against private 
property rights. As a consequence, further barriers to economic growth are erected.
Recently, a number of theoretical and econometric studies have been published that show 
that an insecurity of private property rights can contribute to the relative ineffectiveness of 
the investment process and act as a brake on the average rates (and quality) of economic 
growth. The authors of a number of microeconomic studies of the investment process in 
developing countries have come to similar conclusions.28
Previously, the theory of the dynamics of economic growth gave an important role to 
technical-economic factors, for example, to the capital-employment ratio. Without denying 
the importance of this factor, current analyses give priority to the institutional aspects of de-
YHORSPHQWDQGDERYHDOOWRWKHHIIHFWRIYDULRXVIRUPVRISURSHUW\XSRQWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIWKH
functioning of the economic system.
In recent decades, researchers have tried to quantify the effect of state activity in various 
DUHDVRQUDWHVRIHFRQRPLFJURZWK7KLVLVRIFRXUVHDQH[WUDRUGLQDULO\GLI¿FXOWWDVN²WKH
dynamics of economic life are dependent upon a huge and varied number of factors, and 
the results of the functioning of various links in the state sector can be varied. All of the 
DJJUHJDWHGHFRQRPHWULFFDOFXODWLRQVUHVWXQDYRLGDEO\XSRQDQXPEHURIVLPSOL¿HGDVVXPS-
WLRQVDQGRIFRXUVHKDYHWREHTXDOL¿HGLQPDQ\ZD\V(YHQVRRQHFDQQRWLJQRUHWKHFR-
incidence of the results of these calculations, which are based on the experience of different 
countries and periods and employ a variety of methodologies.
 25 In this connection, we draw attention to the popularity in Russia of the idea of “innovation lift”, narrowly 
understood as a type of transfer of innovation projects, as they approach completion, from one state institution to 
another. It is further argued that large state companies should from now on ask for the results of projects that have 
EHHQ VXSSRUWHGE\ VWDWHGHYHORSPHQWDO LQVWLWXWLRQV7KHUH LV VRPHWKLQJ WREH VDLG IRU DOO VXFKSURSRVDOV/DUJH
state enterprises are not receptive to innovation, and there are many “market failures” and shortcomings in the 
LQWHUDFWLRQVRIPDQ\RIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVLQLQQRYDWLRQSURMHFWV+RZHYHUWKLVDSSURDFKFUHDWHVFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKH
persistent transfer of risk, for a distortion of the motivation of state entities to work in market conditions, and for the 
preservation (and perhaps even extension) of existing “market failures”.
  As in the expression cited above, “growth in the shadow of expropriation”.
  There are many striking examples in Russian legal and business practice, but we refrain from providing case-
studies to avoid selectivity and subjectivism.
 28 6HHIRUH[DPSOH%HVOH\.QDFNDQG.HHIHU6YHQVVRQ=DNDQG.QDFN5RGULNHWDO
$FHPRJOXDQG-RKQVRQ%XWNLHZLF]DQG<DQLNND\D
 $5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
)RUH[DPSOH0-XVWHVHQVWXG\LQJSDQHOGDWDIRURYHUFRXQWULHVIRUWKH\HDUV±
DQGDSSO\LQJWKH³*UDQJHUFDXVDOLW\WHVW´FRQFOXGHVWKDWDOHVVHUSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKH
state (taxes and expenditures) makes for higher rates of economic growth (Justesen, 2008. 
3$FFRUGLQJWR WKHUHVXOWVRISDQHOGDWDFDOFXODWLRQVIRUFRXQWULHVRI WKH(8LQ
calculating the parameters, the Generalized Method of Moments was employed), state con-
sumption and transfer payments from the budget negatively affected economic growth rates 
(Romero-Avila and Strauch, 2008). In another survey, researchers indicate the existence of 
a negative correlation between the aggregate dimensions of the state and economic growth in 
rich countries. According to these calculations, a 10% increase in the dimensions of the state 
WKHJURZWKRIDJJUHJDWHVWDWHH[SHQGLWXUHVDQGRURIRYHUDOOWD[UHYHQXHVLQ*'3FRUUHODWHV
WRDGHFUHDVHRIDYHUDJHDQQXDO UDWHVRIJURZWKE\ WR%HUJKDQG+HQUHNVRQ
2011. P. 885). The effects of an expansion of state consumption in developing countries are 
SDUWLFXODUO\QHJDWLYH%XWNLHZLF]DQG<DQLNND\D'HYDUDMDQHWDO
Given that the increase in state participation in social life over the last few decades and the 
increase in volatility of macroeconomic parameters have coincided in time, the increase of 
WKHIRUPHULVRIWHQDWWULEXWHGWRWKHVWDWH¶VQHHGWRH[HUFLVHDVWDELOL]LQJLQÀXHQFH+RZHYHU
how effective has this regulation been? Of course, in the absence of counter-measures by the 
state, some crises could evidently have had destructive, perhaps even catastrophic conse-
TXHQFHV+RZHYHUQRKDUGDQGUHOLDEOHHYLGHQFHKDVEHHQSURGXFHGWRVKRZWKDWWKHJURZWK
of the state by itself produces a long-term reduction in the volatility of the most important 
macro-economic indicators. On the contrary, econometric research points to the conclusion 
that state expenditure has a destabilizing effect and that there are no grounds for the convic-
tion that the “big state” is capable, by virtue of its size alone, of reducing macroeconomic 
ULVNVɋDUPLJQDQLHWDO3
$VLJQL¿FDQWH[SDQVLRQRI WKH V\VWHPRIFHQWUDOL]HG UHJXODWLRQDQG WKH IRUPDWLRQRI
giant economic complexes in the ownership of the Russian state have further restricted 
the sphere of operation of market processes (by contrast with the experience of a number 
of countries where state enterprises have in a more or less limited fashion “entered into” 
H[LVWLQJFRPSHWLWLYHIUDPHZRUN7KLVKDVWKHHIIHFWRIVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQFUHDVLQJWKHORVVHVWR
society owing to monopolistic or oligopolistic methods of economic management that enable 
state-owned enterprises to deliver goods or services of comparable quality but at a relatively 
higher price.
7KHWUDQVLWLRQWRVWDWHSURSHUW\FUHDWHVWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRULJQRULQJEXGJHWDU\FRQVWUDLQWV
DQGPDNHVSRVVLEOHDUDGLFDOUHWRROLQJRIFRPSDQLHVRUEUDQFKHVRILQGXVWU\+RZHYHUDV
the experience of many countries has shown, the long-term operation of state-owned com-
panies results, in most cases, in the growth of wasteful expenditure (judged by the criteria of 
PDUNHWHI¿FLHQF\0DQ\VWXGLHVKDYHH[DPLQHGWKHIDFWRUVWKDWH[SODLQWKHLQDGHTXDWHÀH[L
ELOLW\ ³WHFKQLFDOHFRQRPLFFRQVHUYDWLVP´DQG ORZHU HI¿FLHQF\RI VWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHV
when compared with those that are privately owned. 
It is precisely the special (state-owned) status of such companies (irrespective of the le-
gal form of property), combined with the strategic position that they occupy in the system 
of economic links and other factors, that provides them access to the most favorable and 
  One research study sees the trust of economic actors in the actions of state institutions and enterprises as being 
DIXQGDPHQWDOIDFWRU$PLVWUXVWRIRI¿FLDOSURQRXQFHPHQWVDQGSURJUDPPHVDQGRIEXUHDXFUDWLFEHKDYLRXURIWHQ
produces negative consequences (Aghion et al., 2010).
  Without wishing to dismiss this argument out of hand, we note that many of these circumstances can be 
interpreted in terms of an opposite relationship of cause and effect: The very increase in the size of the state increases 
the instability of the economy and gives rise to a multitude of additional risks. Much of the empirical research 
UHIHUUHGWREHORZFRQ¿UPVWKLV
  $FFRUGLQJWRDYDLODEOHHVWLPDWHVWKHWRWDORIVXFKHFRQRPLFORVVHVLVRQDYHUDJHRI*'3LQWKHVSKHUHRI
WKH5XVVLDQWUXFNLQJLQGXVWU\DQGRI*'3LQWKHJDVLQGXVWU\7KHORVVHVGHULYLQJIURPVXSHUÀXRXVUHVWULFWLRQV
RQWKHDFFHVVRI5XVVLDQPDUNHWVWRIRUHLJQJRRGVDUHSDUWLFXODUO\KLJK6KDVWLWNRHWDO
$5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
³LQDFFHVVLEOH´SULYDWHVRXUFHVRIFUHGLW+RZHYHUWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKLVPDVVLYHXWLOL]D-
tion of borrowed funds are a matter of serious concern. The receipt of multi-billion currency 
loans has not, in a number of cases, resulted in real accumulation — capital investment in 
machinery and equipment or in the construction of production facilities turns out to be dis-
proportionately small.The prospects for commercially recouping such expenditures are far 
from clear. Consequently, when the deadline for repayment arrives, these companies attempt 
WR UHVWUXFWXUH WKHLU ORDQVDQG ORRNIRUSRVVLELOLWLHV IRU UH¿QDQFLQJ LQ WKHFDSLWDOPDUNHWV
When such efforts are unsuccessful, they invariably turn to the state for assistance. A para-
GR[LFDOVLWXDWLRQDULVHV&RPSDQLHVWKDWGLVSRVHRISRZHUIXO³¿QDQFLDOOHYHUV´H[SHULHQFH
not only during times of crisis but during normal circumstances, an acute need for resources 
and demand urgent support from the state.
:KDWKDVWDNHQSODFHLVLQIDFWDQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIGHMXUHSULYDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS$W
the federal, regional and municipal levels, de jure private enterprises are de facto looked upon 
as state enterprises from the standpoint of the allocation of their goals and social obligations. 
The result is a distortion of decentralized (market) mechanisms that are capable of contribut-
LQJWRDJURZWKRISURGXFWLYHDQGDOORFDWLYHHI¿FLHQF\
5. The trend in recent years towards an increase in the number of public-legal entities and 
for the expansion of the state sector has been accompanied by an increase in the severity of 
policy towards particular private companies. These trends essentially undermine property 
rights and provide evidence of the existence of double-standards: In the real world, the “rules 
of the game” for state-owned companies and for private entrepreneurs differ markedly.
$OORIWKH¿QGLQJVRIPRGHUQHFRQRPLFWKHRU\SRLQWWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHOHJDOV\V-
tem and judicial practice of a country should help to uphold property rights and not assist in 
the dispersal of these rights or contribute to the growth of bureaucratic entrepreneurship. Of 
course, this does not mean that the state should not, in times of severe crisis, provide targeted 
and, as a rule, short-term support to private business.
$VWDWHVWUDWHJ\RIVXSSRUWIRUUDLGHUVFDQXQGHUPLQHWKHEDVLFFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHVWDEOH
existence of private enterprise. In an effective market system, it is only in exceptional cir-
FXPVWDQFHVWKDWWKHVWDWHZLOOQRWVHOORUOHDVHRXWSORWVRIODQGDQGRUSURGXFWLYHFDSDFLW\DW
market prices but just “confer” upon individual participants the property rights to such assets.
:LWKWKHDVVLVWDQFHRIPHFKDQLVPVRIPHUJHUVRUDFTXLVLWLRQV¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWVFDQLP-
pose an important degree of discipline upon private corporations: Of course, if the losses 
of companies increase and the market value of their shares goes into steep decline, then the 
likelihood of their acquisition increases. In Russian practice, during recent years, this process 
has, as it were, been “turned inside out”: The state, and often raiders, which are actively sup-
SRUWHGE\KLJKUDQNLQJRI¿FLDOVLQIHGHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGLQWKHUHJLRQDODGPLQLVWUDWLYHDS-
SDUDWXVVHOHFWVIRUDFTXLVLWLRQRIWKHPRVWG\QDPLFDQGKLJKO\SUR¿WDEOHSULYDWHFRPSDQLHV
The implications of such a transformation of property are evident.
7KHDFWLRQVRILQWHUHVWHGUHFLSLHQWVRIDOOW\SHVRI³SROLWLFDOUHQW´IUHTXHQWO\YLRODWHDF-
tual laws pertaining to state property. For example, the entrusting of the administration of the 
shareholder (property) rights of the state to higher echelons of management, in conditions in 
which the accountability of such individuals (and even of the state companies themselves) is 
XQFOHDUO\GH¿QHGFDQUHVXOWLQWKHWUDQVIHURIDVVHWVRXWRIWKHFRUSRUDWLRQRUWKHLUGLYHUVLRQ
WRZDUGVWKHSURYLVLRQRIDYDULHW\RISULYDWHEHQH¿WV
  2I¿FLDO VWDWLVWLFVGHVFULELQJ WKH LQYHVWPHQWVRIPDQ\6&DQGRI WKHLU IXQGLQJKDYHQRW DV IDU DVZHNQRZ
EHHQSXEOLVKHG(YHQVR³JXHVVWLPDWHV´VXJJHVW WKDW WKHJXOIEHWZHHQWKHLU¿QDQFLDOERUURZLQJDQGWKHLUDFWXDO
DFFXPXODWLRQLVJUHDWHUWKDQLVWKHFDVHIRUH[DPSOHIRUSULYDWHLQGXVWULDO¿UPV:HDOVRQRWHWKDWH[SHQGLWXUHV
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI SURGXFWLRQ FDSDFLWLHV RI WKH FRQJORPHUDWH W\SH DQGRU WKH H[SDQVLRQ RI DQ
“economic empire”, incurred by one company or another, are not included in the expenditures that contribute to the 
real accumulation of the national economy.
  A number of studies have noted similar tendencies, citing the need for soft budget constraints in the funding of 
VWDWHFRPSDQLHVLQ&KLQD7LDQDQG(VWULQ
 $5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
The successful operation of state-owned companies requires the absolute transparency of 
WKHUHOHYDQWHFRQRPLFVWUXFWXUHV&RQVLGHUDEOHHIIRUWVDQG¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVVKRXOGEHGL-
rected not only towards the effective utilization of state property but at the very least towards 
the defense of that property. Unless this is done, the activity of these enterprises risks being 
directed towards the enrichment of their managers.
This aspect of the functioning of existing political and economic institutions can give 
ULVHWR³'LUHFWO\8QSURGXFWLYH3UR¿W6HHNLQJ$FWLYLWLHV²'83´ which, more often than 
not, causes the further expansion of state activity in the economy. What is important is that 
aspects of the non-market economic operations or the “quasi-market” activity of the state-
RZQHGVHFWRUDUHRIWHQWKHVRXUFHRIVSHFL¿FDGGLWLRQDOH[WHUQDOLWLHVZKLFKLQHYLWDEO\UH-
VXOWLQDFRPSDUDWLYHO\OHVVHI¿FLHQWDOORFDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHV
8. A group of companies has come into existence that practice manual control, irrespec-
tive of whether they belong to the public or to the private sector. These companies follow 
certain rules, for the most part informal, of interaction with the state to obtain either ad-
ditional resources or broader responsibilities, and such “exchanges”, at the micro level, of 
state support, preferences and behavior (for example, in providing employment, or technical 
modernization) are as a rule not transparent.
,WLVVXI¿FLHQWWRUHFDOOWKHOLVWRIVRFDOOHG³V\VWHPIRUPLQJ´HQWHUSULVHVWKDWZDVGUDZQ
XSLQ5XVVLDDWWKHKHLJKWRIWKHFULVLVRI± The principal criteria for inclusion 
LQ WKH OLVWZHUH LQÀXHQFHRQHPSOR\PHQWDQ LQIUDVWUXFWXUDOSUR¿OHDQG WKHSRVVHVVLRQRI
XQLTXH WHFKQRORJLFDO FRPSHWHQFLHV$V RI  LW VHHPV WKDW DQHZ FULWHULRQZLOO EH WKH
capacity to implement compensatory measures (measures of support) in response to the eco-
nomic sanctions of the EU and the USA.
:KDWLVWDNLQJSODFHLVDSVHXGRSULYDWL]DWLRQ7KHUHGXFWLRQRIWKHGLUHFWSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
of the state in particular companies is being accompanied by an increase in the role of quasi-
VWDWH LQYHVWRUV LQ WKHPDQDJHPHQWRI WKHLUDFWLYLW\$W WKHVDPH WLPH WKH LQÀXHQFHRI WKH
state over these companies, the principles upon which decisions are based and the extent to 
which the interests of society are taken into account are becoming less transparent and mov-
ing into an area that is poorly regulated. Under the guise of privatization, assets are being de 
facto transferred into the state sector (into state-owned companies), and this is tantamount to 
another turn of the screw in the governmentalization of the economy.
10. In the medium and long term, in the absence of adequate measures for the branch regu-
ODWLRQWKHSULYDWL]DWLRQRIODUJHFRPSDQLHVZLOOUHVXOWLQLQWHQVL¿FDWLRQRILQIRUPDOSUHVVXUH
upon them from the state. Given the underdevelopment of regulation in particular sectors, 
a circumstance that was previously “compensated for” by the direct participation of the state 
in the management of a number of large companies, the state, under the new arrangements, 
will need different instruments for the attainment of socially important goals. The principal 
SUREOHPLQWKLVDUHDLVWKHLQFUHDVLQJODFNRIWUDQVSDUHQF\LQWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIZKDWWKHSXEOLF
interest is with respect to these companies and the emergence of conditions in which social 
interests can be replaced by narrow sectional interests (both institutional and private). Fur-
thermore, delays in the introduction of “external” measures for improving the investment 
FOLPDWHFDQVLJQL¿FDQWO\OLPLWWKHVWUXFWXUDOHIIHFWRISULYDWL]DWLRQ
None of the above is meant to argue, of course, that private enterprises will always and in 
DOOFLUFXPVWDQFHVEHPRUHHI¿FLHQWWKDQVWDWHRZQHGHQWHUSULVHV:HUHSHDWWKDWLQFLUFXP-
stances where the state has genuinely succeeded in turning state corporations into “develop-
  The comparative characteristics of state and private entrepreneurship have been analyzed using theoretical 
models. This analysis showed that in some situations and with the strict observance of all legislative norms, the 
DPRXQWRISULYDWHEHQH¿WVDFTXLUHGE\WKHPDQDJHUVRIVWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVFRXOGVLJQL¿FDQWO\H[FHHGWKHYDOXH
RIUHQWDOLQFRPHWKH\ZRXOGKDYHUHFHLYHGLQWKHHYHQWWKDWWKHLUFRPSDQLHVZHUHSULYDWL]HG/DIIRQW&K
  7KLVWHUPLVLQWURGXFHGLQ%KDJZDWL
  For further details, see Simachev et al., 2012a.
$5DG\JLQHWDO5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
mental institutions”, they are capable for a certain period of time of making use of their 
VSHFLDOVWDWXVLQFOXGLQJWKHLUDFFHVVWRJRYHUQPHQW¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWWRVSHHGXSWKHWUDQV-
formation of conservative economic structures and create more favorable conditions for the 
development of high-tech branches of the economy. 
The creation of companies with state participation and of state-owned developmental 
LQVWLWXWLRQVWRDFRQVLGHUDEOHH[WHQWUHÀHFWVWKHHIIRUWVRIWKHVWDWHWRHVWDEOLVKPRUHHIIHFWLYH
instruments for the implementation of industrial policy. As it happens, the govern ments of 
many developed countries have, in recent years, also adopted a more active policy, aimed 
LQSDUWLFXODU DW UHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQ+RZHYHU DQ LPSRUWDQW SUHFRQGLWLRQRI VXFK LQLWLD-
tives has been the exhaustion of measures of the classical type (privatization, the defense 
of property rights, the development of competition, and the improvement of the investment 
climate). In Russia, the potential for the implementation of such institutional-structural 
UHIRUPVLVIDUIURPKDYLQJEHHQH[KDXVWHGVHH.X]QHWVRYDQG6LPDFKHY,QFLU-
cumstances in which positive institutional change has been inadequate (the very direction 
of policy is unclear) and where precise measures for changing the branch structure of 
the economy are lacking, industrial policy is increasingly concentrated in the state-owned 
sector and depends upon the efforts of a small group of large state-owned companies. 
0HDQZKLOHHI¿FLHQWPHGLXPVFDOHSURMHFWVDQGG\QDPLFDOO\JURZLQJEXVLQHVVHVDUHOHIW
out in the cold.
7. Conclusion 
The arguments deployed above may bear witness to an inadequacy of comparison (even 
a somewhat primitive one) of the institutions of state and private property. The limitation 
RIVXFKDEVWUDFWFODVVL¿FDWLRQVEHFDPHDEXQGDQWO\FOHDUGXULQJWKHSHULRGZKHQRSHQMRLQW
stock companies with a strategic state participation and common (one might almost say 
communal) property were widespread. The structures that are taking shape in Russia at the 
present time display, in our view, a rather complex combination of the features of state and 
private enterprise. A deeper theoretical analysis of the issues in question will enable us to bet-
ter understand the nature of property in the contemporary economy, to distinguish between 
stationary and non-stationary modes of appropriation of assets, to analyze the relationships 
between property and power and in particular to examine the functioning of mechanisms that 
can genuinely enforce property rights. 
These issues will be just as relevant in regard to drafting short-term and medium-term ap-
plied regulatory measures and designing a long-term economic policy for Russia. At a time 
ZKHQPDQ\JRYHUQPHQWVDUH VLJQL¿FDQWO\ UHYLVLQJ WKHLU WKLQNLQJZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH W\SHV
of measures that will be needed if stabilization and growth are to be achieved, the primary 
goals and rationale of the activity of practically all state companies should be reappraised. 
Simultaneously, we should bring into practice new mechanisms for the evaluation of govern-
ment policy, based on the concept of complementarity, whereby the effect of a particular 
instrument is compared with alternative means of utilizing government resources and pro-
perty. Particular attention should be paid to the need to achieve optimal proportions between 
state and private property in different sectors of the economy at a time when we are moving 
towards a new innovation-based type of economic development.
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